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THE POVERTY OF SOCRATIC QUESTIONING: 
ASKING AND ANSWERING IN THE MEND 
Thomas D. Eisele* 
I understand [philosophy 1 as a willingness to think not about some-
thing other than what ordinary human beings think about, but rather 
to learn to think undistractedly about things that ordinary human 
beings cannot help thinking about, or anyway cannot help having 
occur to them, sometimes in fantasy, sometimes asa flash across a 
landscape; such things, for example, as whether we can know the 
world as it is in itself, or whether others really know the nature of 
one's own experiences, or whether good and bad are relative, or 
whether we might not now be dreaming that we are awake, or 
whether modern tyrannies and weapons and spaces and speeds and 
art are continuous with the past of the human race or discontinuous, 
and hence whether the learning of the human race is not irrelevant to 
the problems it has brought before itself. Such thoughts are instances 
of that characteristic human willingness to allow questions for itself 
which it cannot answer with satisfaction. Cynics about philosophy, 
and perhaps about humanity, will find that questions without an-
swers are empty; dogmatists will claim to have arrived at answers; 
philosophers after my heart will rather wish to convey the thought 
that while there may be no satisfying answers to such questions in 
certain forms, there are, so to speak, directions to answers, ways to 
think, that are worth the time of your life to discover. (It is a further 
question for me whether directions of this kind are teachable, in ways 
suited to what we think of as schools.)1 
For those of us who still claim that we teach Socratlcally, or who 
think of our teaching as being inspired by Socrates' example, it re-
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. J.D., 1973, Harvard University. Ph.D. 
(Philosophy), 1984, University of Michigan. 
This Essay examines Socratic teaching by investigating Socrates' practice in the Meno. Its 
companion essay, Bitter Knowledge: Socrates and Teaching by Disillusionment, examines So-
cratic teaching by investigating my own practice in law school today. They are meant to comple-
ment and to complicate one another, as they also are meant to extend and to supplement some 
of the views of Socratic teaching expressed in two earlier essays of mine: Thomas D. Eisele, 
Must Virtue Be Taught?, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495 (1987) [hereinafter Eisele, Virtue]; and 
Thomas D. Eisele, "Never Mind the Manner of My Speech": The Dilemma of Socrates' De-
fense in the Apology, 14 LEGAL STUD. F. 253 (1990) [hereinafter Eisele, Speech]. 
Professors L.R. LaRue, Thomas Shaffer, and James Boyd White have offered me several 
generous criticisms in the best Socratic spirit of the inquiry. I dedicate this Essay to Jim White. 
The inspiration and example of his work have proven to be, for me, indispensable. 
1. STANLEY CAVELL, The Thought of Movies, in THEMES OUT OF SCHOOL: EFFECTS 
AND CAUSES 3, 9 (1984). 
221 
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mains a challenge to account for whatever affinity there may be be-
tween our teaching and that of Socrates. The affinity (if any) can be 
elusive. Yet, trying to understand what I am doing when I teach as I 
do in law school continues to matter to me, and an important part of 
this continued interest concerns the relation that my teaching may have 
with that of Socrates. In this, I suppose that I am not much different 
from other men and women who find themselves spending much of 
their time in the classroom asking questions-questions that may seem 
as much asked of oneself as they are of one's students. It can be an odd 
way to spend an hour. 
The strangeness of the situation is two-fold. First, the method or 
technique of Socratic questioning seems to be simplicity itself. What 
we do is simply to ask questions of others: questions about cases and 
statutes and rules and about the reasons for those rules or for the 
court's decision or for the legislature's enactment; questions about facts 
and what happened to the parties involved and about others who might 
have become involved or whose assistance in resolving the dispute 
might have been sought; questions about procedure and what was done 
to bring this dispute to the position in which we find it and about ways 
that might have been found to resolve or at least to prosecute it differ-
ently; and so on. How can that be revolutionary? How can that be a 
radical way to teach? 
However we may attempt to answer such questions, we know-we 
can see-that this method of questioning is revolutionary, is radical. 
For one thing, it has radical or revolutionary results. We can see the 
results in our students (some of them, surely); that is, we can see the 
results in the way that our students learn to question the cases and 
statutes and rules for themselves; learn how to take the cases and stat-
utes and rules apart analytically and to put them back together again; 
learn how to apply the rules and cases and how to distinguish them; 
and learn all the other techniques that we teach our students for work-
ing in the law. And then, too, there are some techniques of lawyering 
that our students learn without their being taught; they discover these 
techniques by themselves in their engagement with the materials and 
the medium of the law. Yet all of this is an anticipated benefit of 
teaching inspired by Socrates. We know that our students learn more 
than we can teach them; Socratic questioning is intended exactly to 
provoke them to further study and self-discovery. 
For other students, the impact and rewards of Socratic teaching are 
less immediate. Still, there always are some students who, without 
seeming to have acquired the knack of what we were trying to teach 
them during law school, report back to us or to some colleague of ours, 
years later, that this or that question, uttered once a long time ago, 
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almost forgotten, at some point awoke that student from his or her 
slumbers. I think that almost every teacher during his or her career 
must have heard at least one such testimonial to the daunting, energiz-
ing, cumulative impact of our questioning. But, then, how can such a 
simple process of questioning have this seemingly disproportionate 
effect? 
I said that the strangeness of our situation is two-fold, and the sec-
ond oddity is that, when looking specifically at the effect that Socratic 
questioning has on students, one finds, I think, a strong element of 
disillusionment. How is it that we law teachers earn our living by dis-
illusioning our students? What good is that? 
In a companion Essay,2 I have described certain aspects of my law 
school teaching, saying that, in part, my teaching aims at disillusioning 
my students and, yet, that this is not all that my teaching aims 
at-there is something else again that I also try to teach. Both aspects 
of my teaching (the initial disillusionment, and the something else 
again) are intimate points of relation with Socrates' way of teaching. It 
is quite possible that I am wrong about this, of course, or that, in this 
respect, my teaching is not representative of what other law teachers 
do. But I do not think so; rather, I think the kinship is there, for me 
and for others. So, to the extent that we teachers of law truly intend to 
inherit the legacy of Socrates, I believe that we are asked to accept as a 
part of our legacy intentionally teaching so as to disillusion our stu-
dents, and yet we are intending to supply them with something else as 
well. How can this be? What might it mean? 
In the following pages, I pursue these questions, not from the van-
tage point of the way in which I teach in law school, but rather from 
the perspective of the way in which Socrates taught in the dialogues 
that we have inherited from Plato. For, in order to claim an affinity 
between what we do in law school and what Socrates did, we need a 
detailed description of both terms in this pairing. In this Essay, I sup-
ply an account of the Socratic side of the coin. 
I. THE Meno's Progress and Meno's Progress 
The Meno 3 proposes itself for study in this regard because it occu-
2. Thomas D. Eisele, Bitter Know/edge: Socrates and Teaching by DisiIIusionment, 45 
MERCER L. REV. 587 (1994). 
3. Throughout this Essay, I use the Jowett translation, which seems to be the standard 
translation of the Meno and the most readily available. It can be found as follows: PLATO, 
MENo (Benjamin Jowett trans., 3d ed. Library of Liberal Arts 1949) (including introduction by 
Fulton H. Anderson) [hereinafter Jowett & Anderson]; 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 349 
(Benjamin Jowett trans., 3d ed. Random House 1937) (including introduction by Raphael De-
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pies a central place in Plato's dialogues. So far as scholars have been 
able to date and organize the dialogues,· the Meno comes after the 
period of the early dialogues (including the Protagoras and the Gor-
gias), and it begins the period of the middle dialogues (preceding, per-
haps immediately, the Republic). The Meno also is central in the 
sense that it articulates the major Platonic themes that we have come 
to expect. First and foremost, it deals with education (as do most of the 
early and middle dialogues): how we are to educate the young and, in 
particular, whether it is possible to teach them virtue. But beyond the 
core question of our ability to teach or to train a young person in 
virtue, the Meno also considers the nature of knowledge and whether 
it is a kind of recollection; it introduces a conception of the "forms" (to 
be elaborated in later dialogues); it draws distinctions between sense 
and reason, true opinion and knowledge; and it incompletely pursues 
notions of justice and of what we understand justice to be. The Meno 
manages to do all of this in dialogue form-not the traditional prose of 
analytic treatise writing-within the compass of thirty to forty pages. 
It is not surprising, then, that F.H. Anderson, in the Library of Lib-
eral Arts edition of this dialogue, begins his Introduction with this 
praise: "The Meno is described by Walter Pater as the 'most charac-
teristic dialogue of Plato.' John Stuart Mill calls it a 'gem' among Pla-
tonic works, and most aptly, for in no other dialogue of Plato are there 
exhibited within comparable compass so many facets as the Meno 
contains. "6 
My interest in the Meno has less to do with the dialogue's illustra-
tion of Platonic themes, however, than with its depiction of Socrates' 
mos). All quotations in this Essay from the Meno, as well as all citations to the Meno, are from 
and to the Library of Liberal Arts edition. To enable readers to find the relevant passage in 
other translations, however, I have provided parallel parenthetical citations to the standard 
Stephanus pagination. 
I also have used three other translations of the Meno, all more modern than Jowett's 
translation, in clarifying some of the points that I found problematic. All three modern transla-
tions have proven helpful: 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 131 (Reginald E. Allen trans., Yale 
u.P. 1984) [hereinafter Allen]; PLATO'S MENO (Malcolm Brown ed. & W.K.C. Guthrie trans., 
Bobbs-Merrill 1971) [hereinafter Brown & Guthrie]; PLATO'S MENO (G.M.A. Grube trans., 
2d ed. Hackett 1980) [hereinafter Grube]. 
4. See Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 7; Grube, supra note 3, at 1; Brown & Guth-
rie, supra note 3, at xii. Professor Allen has the best discussion that I have read of the problems 
involved in trying to date and organize the Platonic dialogues. See Allen, supra note 3, at 6-16; 
see also GREGORY VLASTOS, SOCRATES. IRONIST AND MORAL PHILOSOPHER 45-53 (1991). 
5. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 7. Perhaps it is worth mentioning, in this context, 
that Kierkegaard equally felt the power of the Meno. In his tract on instruction, Philosophical 
Fragments, Kierkegaard's initial question ("How far does the Truth admit of being learned?") 
is related directly to the paradox of inquiry, see infra text accompanying notes 69, 92, put by 
Meno to Socrates. See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS OR A FRAGMENT 
OF PHILOSOPHY 11 (David Swenso!l & Howard Hong trans., 2d ed. 1962). 
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teaching. It contains a vivid portrait of Socrates in action, as a teacher 
and a learner, a searcher and an inquirer. The dialogue opens with a 
discussion between Socrates and Meno; then it shifts to a much shorter 
exchange between Socrates and Meno's slave-boy; and this exchange is 
itself briefly interrupted by a short discussion between Socrates and 
Meno again. When Socrates finishes with the slave-boy, another brief 
discussion occurs between Socrates and Meno, which also is inter-
rupted by the appearance of Anytus, an Athenian, with whom Socrates 
takes the time to converse. The dialogue then concludes with yet an-
other discussion between Socrates and Meno. 
The movement of the Meno can be outlined this way: 
1. Socrates and Meno (pp. 23-38 (70a-82b» 
2. Socrates and the Slave-Boy (pp. 38-41, 42-43 (82b-84a, 84d-85b» 
(with an interlude for Socrates and Meno, pp. 41-42 (84a-d» 
3. Socrates and Meno (pp. 43-49 (85b-8ge» 
4. Socrates and Anytus (pp. 49-55 (90a-95a» 
5. Socrates and Meno (pp. 55-61 (95a-100b» 
This synoptic outline reveals that Meno is the chief character of this 
drama; he (or something about him that we are supposed to notice) is 
the subject of this dialogue. We see Meno at three different stages: 
first, when he meets Socrates and asks him a question; second, after 
Socrates has discussed some geometric figures with Meno's slave-boy; 
and, third, after Socrates has discussed virtue and knowledge with 
Anytus, a passing Athenian. So, I take the Meno's progress to be 
Meno's progress, his growth or education. 
But a second theme, something else besides a simple charting of 
Meno's growth, is going on simultaneously. During the course of this 
dialogue, Socrates converses with three people. These three people il-
lustrate three different types of students, three different ways that peo-
ple have of learning and gaining knowledge. Socrates mainly asks them 
questions, and his questions elicit different responses and results. As 
the Meno progresses, then, we see Socrates teaching three different 
students by talking with them and questioning them, and we also see 
how they are affected or unaffected by this discussion and these 
questions. 
Let me begin with this second theme: the three different types of 
students. They are different types of students in the sense that they are 
differently prepared and differently motivated in their discussions with 
Socrates. In this respect, these three people are differently situated both 
in terms of their ability or willingness to learn and in terms of how 
they relate to Socrates as their teacher. 
Meno begins the dialogue by putting a question to Socrates, a ques-
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tion about how virtue is acquired, a question that Socrates for some 
reason does not like.s Not answering it directly, Socrates puts Meno's 
question aside and. instead asks Meno a question about the nature of 
virtue, which Meno finds painfully easy: "There will be no difficulty, 
Socrates, in answering your question.'" For the next few pages of dia-
logue, Meno then tries unsuccessfully to answer Socrates' "easy" 
question.8 
Meno's slave-boy, by contrast, initiates nothing; he puts no initial 
question to Socrates. Rather, Meno picks the slave-boy out of a crowd 
of surrounding servants, and Socrates asks him questions.9 But, once 
engaged by Socrates, the slave-boy, who is initially quite timid, eventu-
ally makes a claim to know something. It turns out, however, that the 
slave-boy's claim to know is wrong; it is based upon a false inference. Io 
Socrates then corrects this false inference, leaving the slave-boy some-
what abashed. But Socrates, taking the slave-boy in tow, once again 
leads him through a maze of questions to the correct inference and 
allows him to draw it for himself.ll Emboldened, the slave-boy then is 
asked a further series of questions, which elicit the fact that he still 
does not understand. He may have made the correct inference when 
coa"ched by Socrates, but his correct guess was not based on knowledge 
or understanding. Socrates' questions get the slave-boy to see, then, 
that he still does not know what he thought he knew: "Indeed, Socra-
tes, I do not know."12 
Anytus comes along later and joins Socrates and Meno while they 
are engaged, once again, in their common pursuit of the question of 
the nature and teachability of virtue. IS Anytus is an important Athe-
nian politician (who later plays a role in the trial of Socrates) and is 
conveniently pressed into service, as the slave-boy was. But Anytus il-
lustrates a different cast of mind, a different educational attitude, be-
cause he is not susceptible to Socrates' searching questions. 
Socrates begins by simply asking Anytus, as a friendly bystander, for 
help: "Who are the teachers of virtue ?"14 One might expect Anytus to 
be disposed to respond warmly to Socrates' invitation, because Anytus 
shares Socrates' low opinion of the Sophists as purported teachers of 
6. See Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 23-24 (70a-7Ib). 
7. [d. at 24 (7Ie). 
8. See id. at 24-29 (7Ic-75b). 
9. See id. at 38 (82b). 
10. See id. at 39 (82e). 
11. See id. at 40 (83b-c). 
12. [d. at 41 (84a). 
13. See id. at 49 (8ge-90a). 
14. [d. at 49 (90b). 
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virtue, and Socrates· casts his question in the form of a re-
quest-whether Anytus can help Meno find someone who can teach 
him (Meno) virtue. III Instead of helping Meno, however, Anytus re-
sponds by castigating the Sophists; he vents his. spleen: 
Anytus: By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or 
kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will 
ever be so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them [the 
Sophists]; for they are a manifest pest and corrupting influence to 
those who have to do with them. 18 
It turns out that this invective is not worth much as advice for Meno 
because, when Anytus is pressed on the matter, we discover that Any-
tus' criticism of the Sophists is as unfounded in knowledge as the slave-
boy's original inference was. Anytus admits that he really is not well-
acquainted with the Sophists.17 This admission puzzles Socrates, as 
does the cavalier attitude toward knowledge and criticism that· it 
reveals, and he says as much. IS How can Anytus claim to know that 
the Sophists are corrupt teachers of virtue when Anytus is not ac-
quainted with the Sophists? But, unlike the slave-boy, Anytus does not 
see (or acknowledge) his own ignorance in this matter. "I am sure that 
I know what manner of men these are, whether I am acquainted with 
them or not."19 
Then, to cap it off, Anytus shuns Socrates' suggestion that perhaps 
some noted Athenians themselves do not know what virtue is, or, at 
least, that they have been unable to teach their children virtue. Anytus 
is offended by this Socratic suggestion; he finds it slanderous, and he 
refuses to entertain or to consider it by way of helping Socrates to 
investigate it.20 
I said that these three students differ in their cast of mind, their 
attitude toward learning or education. Part of their difference is their 
motivation: Meno wants to know, he wants to learn. The dialogue be-
gins with his questioning Socrates. In a sense, one can say that Meno's 
question about virtue is the motivating question of the Meno. The fact 
that he does not know what to do with his own question, that he does 
not know how to pursue it on his own, is less important than the fact 
that the question is his own, that he came up with it by listening to 
himself, by harkening to some doubt or quibble in himself. Is this not 
15. See id. at 50 (91a-b). 
16. Id. at 50-51 (9.1 c). 
17. See id. at 51-52 (92b-c). 
18. See id. at 52 (92b-c). 
19. Id. (92c). 
20. See id. at 53-54 (93c-95a). 
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what we hope to teach our students to do by way of Socratic question-
ing-how to pursue their own questions, how to make the most of 
them? 
If we agree that Meno's question is the motivating question of the 
dialogue, then we must immediately acknowledge the other side of that 
fact, namely, that Meno does not know what to do with his own ques-
tion. And this ignorance is a part of what Socrates brings out in the 
first few pages of the dialogue. He shows Meno not only that he 
(Meno) does not have an acceptable or adequate answer to his own 
question (that is not so bad in itself; the same is true of many of us 
many times), but, more importantly, that Meno does not realize this 
about himself. When Meno puts his question to Socrates, he is una-
ware of this failing in himself, in his knowledge. This may be one 
reason why Socrates refuses the question about virtue as it is originally 
put to him by Meno. He does not refuse the topic of virtue-its nature 
or its teachability-il'\deed, Socrates is obsessed with such matters. But 
he does refuse the form and tone of Meno's question, the attitude in 
which it is asked. 
Socrates' refusal to answer Meno's question as asked is as positive 
as it is negative, because it leads to a concerted investigation into the 
nature and teachability of virtue. It does so; however, only in so far as 
Meno is willing to take up these matters in a form and with an atti-
tude that Socrates finds proper. This may strike some people as being 
hopelessly paternalistic of Socrates, but I take it to be an essential ele-
ment of anything that we might call "teaching." Teaching requires 
that a student be able to participate with the teacher, be able to see or 
take or accept what the teacher says as significant, valuable, or worth-
while. Teaching also requires, a willingness and an ability on the part 
of the teacher to say, "This is proper; that is not." And the teacher 
must also be able to show its propriety, to demonstrate it, in his or her 
actions, in his or her teaching, to the satisfaction of the student. The 
student must see how this test of the experiment, how this development 
of the equation or proof, how this interpretation of doctrine or rule or 
statute, how this reading of the case or text or poem, makes sense in 
the context of the materials with which they-teacher and stu-
dent-are working. The teacher must be able to make sense out of 
these materials-legal sense, literary sense, or philosophical 
sense-and the student must be able to follow this educative activity. 
And then the student must go on to make his or her own constructions, 
constructions that themselves make acceptable sense out of the very 
same materials. 
This conveyance of a sense of propriety-in the questions one asks, 
in the ways in which one pursues them, in the answers that one finds 
HeinOnline -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 229 1994-1995
1994] POVERTY OF SOCRATIC QUESTIONING 229 
acceptable or satisfying-is inherent in teaching. Meno's education in 
this dialogue consists in the fact that he learns to seek as Socrate~ 
seeks, learns to inquire as Socrates inquires. And yet, Socrates ulti-
mately leaves Meno on his own, to inquire for himself and on his own 
behalf (and on behalf of others) into these matters that are puzzling 
him. 
So, while Socrates refuses Meno's opening question as it is initially 
presented to him, Socrates also shows Meno a way to put Meno's own 
question fruitfully-a way to translate it, or to understand it, that can 
be fruitfully followed out and investigated (if not exac~ly to an answer, 
then at least to a conclusion). And through it all, despite several set-
backs and even reprimands from Socrates, Meno never totally gives up, 
never leaves the discussion or inquiry. Certainly, he is daunted by 
some of Socrates' methods and his tough questions. Often Meno does 
not know what to say or do in response to Socrates' questions or to one 
of the many impasses they reach in their inquiry into virtue. (But then, 
neither does Socrates always know what to say or do.) The point re-
mains that Menonever calls it quits; he perseveres. . 
Anytus, on the other hand, does not want to know. He not only does 
not want to know about virtue, but he essentially refuses to listen to 
whatever Socrates has to say. Eventually he leaves in a huff over what 
he imagines to have been Socrates' defamation of some of the rich, 
important, and famous men and families of Athens. 21 (It seems patent 
that Plato is relying upon his audience's presumed knowledge of Any-
tus' later participation in the trial against Socrates, where Anytus 
presented to the jury the charges leveled by the politicians against Soc-
rates. 22) Anytus never shows himself to be open to Socrates' questions; 
the concerns that Socrates has about the possible teachability of virtue 
and its essence or nature leave Anytus cold-or closed. He has nothing 
to do with them. 
Furthermore, Anytus has no questions of his own. He hates the 
Sophists with a passion, perhaps a passion as great as Socrates' disdain 
for them. But Anytus' passion is based on nothing: no knowledge, no 
experience, no acquaintance with the Sophists. Anytus knows what he 
thinks, but not why he thinks as he does; and he seems not to be quiz-
zical about the whys and wherefores of his opinions. With such a stu-
dent, nothing works; a teacher can do nothing with him. (But perhaps 
21. See id. at 55 (95a). 
22. For further details on Anytus' participation in Socrates' trial for impiety and cor-
rupting the youth of Athens, see PLATO, The Apology, in EUTHYPHRO. ApOLOGY, CRITO 21, 
22 n.l, 23 n.2, 28, 34, 35, 39 n.8, 41 (F.J. Church & Robert D. Cumming trans., 2d rev. ed., 
Library of Liberal Arts 1956). 
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it is the teacher.23 Then the question becomes whether another teacher 
can reach this student, can do a better job of inspiring or provoking the 
student. While this possibility is a faint one, it may help to account for 
the fact that, at the very end of the dialogue, Socrates implores Meno, 
now that he has been taught the Socratic method, to seek out Anytus 
and to show him the way, to try to awaken him to these same ques-
tions and concerns.24 Perhaps Meno can do what Socrates was unable 
to do. I doubt it.) 
The slave-boy, in the middle of the dialogue, also splits the differ-
ence between the two opposites of Meno and Anytus. Meno's slave-boy 
is neither like Meno in initiating any inquiry with Socrates, in want-
ing to know, nor is he akin to Anytus in not wanting to know. Rather, 
the slave-boy is like Anytus in his initial passiveness, his self-satisfac-
tion with his state of knowledge-even if it turns out to be a state of 
ignorance-and yet, he also is like Meno in that, once provoked by 
Socrates' questions, the slave-boy is willing to learn. Thus, the slave-
boy starts in a passive mode and then changes into an active learner, 
an active seeker. If Meno can be said to want to know, and Anytus not 
to want to know, then the slave-boy can be said to be open to knowl-
edge, to its possibility or possible acquisition, although he does not 
know how to begin. He is there, he is passive, he is comfortable in his 
supposed knowledge, or even in his ignorance-but he can be 
provoked. 
If we say, then, that the slave-boy can be provoked, that Meno can 
be taught (even though he thinks he already knows the answers to the 
questions that Socrates initially asks him), and that Anytus cannot be 
taught (because he is not interested in learning, in being taught, and 
thus cannot be provoked into inquiry by Socrates' questions), this sug-
gests another important difference among these three types of students: 
their relative receptivity to Socratic questioning. 
Even though Meno thinks that he knows, he is able to recognize 
23. This is the converse of the point made earlier regarding the requirement that the stu-
dent be able to take what the teacher says as significant, important, or worthwhile. See supra p. 
228. Here we are looking at the teacher, who needs to be able to take the student's response as 
significant. Otherwise, as Stanley Cavell puts it, the student will not learn (at least, not from 
this teacher): 
If my teacher of French will not accept what I say and do as what he says and 
does, perhaps treating my American accent with tacit contempt, then I will not 
learn French (from him). But what happens if "my elders", all of them (those 
bigger people from whom ... I learn to use words), will not accept what I say 
and do as what they say and do? Must they? Is it only natural for them to? Is it 
their responsibility? 
STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 28 (1979). 
24. See Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 61 (100b-c). 
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from his stumbling, bumbling responses to Socrates' questions that he 
does not know, or at least that he needs help, needs teaching. Meno is 
receptive to Socrates' questions, although it takes him a while to get 
their drift. (This is shown in a crucial sequence of exchanges in the 
dialogue, to which we shall return.2&) 
The slave-boy, on the other hand, does not necessarily think in the 
beginning that he knows at all; he is quite shy and hesitant in Socrates' 
presen~e. But Socrates manages to draw him out, and gradually the 
slave-boy gains enough confidence in his ability to answer Socrates' 
question that he then ventures an opinion, one that he claims is based 
on knowledge-which claim is then shown to be wrong. Dashed, the 
slave-boy retreats into silence. But he still is willing and able to be 
reached again by Socrates, who by careful questioning again draws the 
slave-boy out of his shell and leads him to the correct inference, to the 
r:ight answer: Socrates leads him to knowledge. 
Whatever knowledge is gained by Meno and the slave-boy is due 
not only to Socrates' estimable art of asking the right questions, but 
also to Meno's and the slave-boy's receptivity to Socrates' questions. 
These two students are praiseworthy in their resourceful receptivity, 
their willingness to entertain questions. Meno is, of course, the central 
study here, and his perseverance in the face of Socrates' sustained criti-
cism deserves credit. But the slave-boy also merits praise. He may not 
be a self-starter, the way that Meno seems to be, and the slave-boy 
may be a bit timid, but he is, nonetheless, brave in facing Socrates' 
relentless questioning and in continuing to volunteer answers, to offer 
responses, even when they are offered with trepidation. 
Compared to either Meno or the slave-boy, Anytus is unreceptive to 
Socrates' questions. It is not that he rejects them out of hand, or that 
he refuses to listen, because initially Anytus participates with Socrates. 
But even Anytus' initial responses seem perfunctory;28 and, after Soc-
rates scorns Anytus' criticism of the Sophists (as being unfounded in 
knowledge) and begins to question Anytus as to the ability of impor-
tant Athenians to teach their children to be virtuous, Anytus' responses 
become churlish. Anytus finds such questions scandalous, an affront to 
the good families of Athens, and eventually refuses to hear them.27 He 
is not receptive to Socratic questions, or to inquiry, or .to learning. 
25. See infra pp. 239-42. 
26. See Jowett &. Anderson, supra note 3, at 49-50 (90c-91 b). 
27. See id. at 52-54 (92c-95a). 
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II. WHEN Two Go TOGETHER: THE NATURE OF SOCRATIC 
INQUIRY 
I began the previous "Section by saying that Meno is the central 
character in this dialogue and that throughout it we are meant to see 
something about him (call it his "education").28 But, since then, I have 
been surveying three types of students as embodied by Meno, the 
slave-boy, and Anytus. Perhaps I can now say the following with some 
warrant: Meno wants to learn, but is initially unaware of his igno-
rance; the slave-boy does not begin by wanting to learn, but it turns 
out that he is willing to listen to Socrates' questions and to give them a 
try; and Anytus neither wants to learn nor is he willing to listen or to 
be provoked into inquiry by Socrates' questions. This would be one 
expansion of my earlier remark that these three people are differently 
situated in terms of their ability or willingness to learn and in terms of 
how they relate to Socrates as their teacher.29 
As their teacher, Socrates is trying to show these students (with va-
rying degrees of success) how to inquire into matters that they may 
find puzzling or that they may be provoked to begin questioning and, 
for this purpose, is trying to teach them the method of inquiry that he 
has developed. We can read the Men 0, then, not simply as an illustra-
tion of Meno's growth and education-although surely it is that-but 
also as a dialogue that illustrates the Socratic method in action. And, of 
course, since the Socratic method is a means of education, these are 
really two sides of the same phenomenon: Socrates uses his method as 
a way of educating Meno, and his education of Meno exemplifies the 
Socratic method. 
Perhaps the first thing to note about the Socratic method of inquiry 
is that it requires two or more people talking with one another, shar-
ing their views and thoughts, their words and ideas, trying to express 
things to their own satisfaction and to the satisfaction of the other per-
son involved. During this intense conversational process, each of the 
participants is urged to be candid, to say what he or she really thinks, 
feels, or believes. (As Socrates remarks once to the slave-boy, "Very 
good; I like to hear you say what you think."30) Each participant also 
is asked to be brutally honest in assessing himself or herself and his or 
her conversational partner, either when a flaw is found or when con-
viction is reached. To discover that either of the partners in inquiry is 
talking nonsense, or does not mean what he or she says, or does not 
28. See supra p. 225. 
29. See id. 
30. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 40 (83d). 
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know what he or she is saying, is to be refuted (what Socrates calls 
"elenchus"31). So, Socratic inquiry is shared inquiry. It does not work 
alone and is not meant to work alone.32 Why? 
31. I am talking here in general terms about the "Socratic method" and "Socratic in-
quiry," and I might appropriately be asked to specify what exactly these terms mean. For 
example, Professor L.H. LaRue has put to me the distinction that e1enchus is not so much a 
method of inquiry as it is a method of testing, testing the truth and consistency of one's beliefs 
and claims. On this understanding of Socratic method, the initial inquiry is bent on evoking 
assertions or claims, which then are tested by the elenchic method of argument and refutation. If 
the assertions pass this test and do not stand refuted or are not found to be inconsistent, then 
they are likely to be true. 
But there is a sense, of course, in which the activity of elenchic argument and refutation 
can be said to be "inquiry," because to test the truth or falsity of an assertion or claim is to 
inquire into its truth or falsity. In addition, and perhaps more to the point, I find myself want-
ing to say that.the process or activity of elenchic argument and testing is one way to inquire into 
the knowledge that a person has. If we try to refute ourselves or the assertio~ or claim of 
another person and end up doing so, then we discover something about ourselves or about that 
other person-namely, that we (or he or she) did not know. This is an addition to our knowl-
edge (either of ourselves or of another). On the other hand, if we try to refute o!lrselves (or 
another) and end up not being able to do so, then we discover that probably we do (or the other 
does) know what we claim (or he or she claimed) to know. So, again, this is an addition to our 
knowledge (either of ourselves or of another). So, in this respect, have we not used the elenchic 
method to inquire into the state of knowledge of a person? See infra note 78. 
On the nature of elenchus in Socrates' dialectical method, James Boyd White says the 
following: 
The one who claims to know knows nothing after an. This is the elenchus, or 
refutation, of which Socrates repeatedly speaks, and it is the heart of dialectic. It 
results in a mortification or humiliation of a special kind, for one is mortified by 
the invocation not of new facts or ideas but of what one already knows or claims 
to know. One part of the self is appealed to against another part, and in the 
process a previously unknown self-contradiction is revealed. . 
[A) dialectical refutation (elenchos) requires that one make the other agree with 
what one says .... What matters between us is not the other witnesses who can 
be brought forward to support your view or mine but whether you can make me 
your witness or I can make you mine. For dialectic to exert its fu\1 force upon the 
individual mind, complete frankness is essential, a kind of shamelessness in saying 
what one rea\1y thinks. 
JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 95, 102 (1984). 
For a further discussion about elenchus, see Eisele, Speech, supra note *, at 274-75. 
32. Socrates emphasizes this aspect of his inquiry several times throughout the dialogue. 
For example, he discreetly but firmly draws Meno's attention to the fact that their investigation 
is a shared effort when he says, "I have no objection to join with you in the inquiry." Jowett & 
Anderson, supra note 3, at 36 (80d). Or, again, Socrates gently reminds Meno of what they ar.e 
about when he asks, "[S)ha\1 you and I make an effort to inquire together into the nature of 
virtue?" Id. at 45 (86c). , 
The same is true of Socrates' effort in talking with Meno's slave-boy. "Mark now the 
further development. I shall only ask him, and not teach him, and he shal1 share the inquiry 
with me." Id. at 42 (84c-d). Since Socrates' discussion with Meno's slave-boy is itself a shared 
inquiry, it would not work, it would not be worth doing (because it would not illustrate what 
Socrates wants to show Meno and because it would not be educative for the slave-boy), were it 
not truly shared by both of them. 
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I believe that Socrates works together with others because he realizes 
that, in philosophy, we are working with our ordinary thoughts about 
ordinary things (as Stanley Cavell reminds us in the motto to this Es-
say3S). Or, as G.M. Young was fond of saying, following Maitland, 
our work in the humanities-such as history, law, and philoso-
phy-deals with our "common thoughts of common things."34 And 
other people are as much a source of knowledge and information about 
these matters as we are; their views, their minds, their conceptions, are 
as revelatory as ours are of the theories or constructions that we may 
possess on such matters. What we wish to learn about is something 
common to all of us, and in this respect it is something that we share 
(or that we are capable of sharing). It is a part of our common inheri-
tance as human beings, a shared possession, or at least a shared object, 
of knowledge and experience. In the Men 0, the inquiry happens to be 
focused upon the nature and the attributes of virtue: what it is, how 
human beings gain or lose or exemplify it, how it can be transmitted 
between generations, and so forth. But the question pursued by Socra-
tes might just as easily be the nature and extent of our knowledge, or 
what piety is and how we act piously or impiously, or what human 
courage amounts to, or how we become wise and· what good wisdom is 
to us, or what the nature of happiness is, or how power. is a part of 
human life and society and the ways in which power can be distin-
guished from justice or law, or any of a number of other topics of 
inquiry. All of these may be said to name philosophical topics, no 
doubt, but they are topics of philosophical thought, inquiry, and dis-
cussion because they are common concerns of human beings, things 
about which we humans periodically and unpredictably come to be 
struck, confused, intrigued, or puzzled. The specific topic for philo-
sophical attention, for Socratic inquiry, makes little difference; what 
matters is that the chosen topic is of genuine interest or puzzlement to 
33. CAVELL, supra note 1, at 9. Another relevant comment from Cavell is the following: 
[T]he ordinary world ... may not be all there is, but it is important enough: 
morality is in that world, and so are force and love; so is art and a part of knowl-
edge (the part which is about that world); and so is religion (wherever God is). 
Some mathematics and science, no doubt, are not. 
STANLEY CAVELL, Must We Mean What We Say?, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 1, 
40 (1969). 
As to the ordinariness or commonness of Socrates' topics, see Eisele, Speech, supra note ., 
at 268. 
34. G.M. YOUNG, Maitland, in DAYLIGHT AND CHAMPAIGN 288, 290 (1937) ("Law, as 
[Maitland] understood it, is fundamentally a system of common thought about common 
things."); FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, The Hide, in DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 357, 520 
(1897) ("Above all, by slow degrees the thoughts of our forefathers, their common thoughts 
about common things, will have become thinkable once more."). 
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us, to those of us engaged in the inquiry. (And since the given topic 
intrigues or attracts us, disturbs or distracts us, it is as accurate to say 
that the topic picks us as it is to say that we "choose" it.) 
In such a context, no one of us is better situated or equipped than 
anyone else; what we wish to know is exactly something about our 
common inheritance. This is one reason why Socrates denies himself to 
no one.all If someone approaches Socrates and asks him a question, this 
questioner has Socrates' attention (not necessarily his respect or assent, 
but his attention). And this also seems to be why Socrates takes his 
interlocutors when, where, and as he finds them. Yes, Socrates wants 
to make them better (more acute, more sensitive to the contents and 
limits of their lives); yes, he wishes to educate them in the ways of his 
Socratic method of inquiry. But, still, Socrates begins with the truly 
humble feeling that he can learn from anyone, from everyone. He can. 
We can too, if we know how, if we will learn how (from him). 
The Socratic way of inquiring philosophically into matters of com-
mon knowledge that continue to befuddle and perplex us is to seek to 
formulate an adequate definition of the topic in question. We do this, 
according to Socrates, by offering definitions of the topic at hand and 
then testing these definitions for their adequacy. Regardless of whether 
one agrees with Socrates' attempt to find an acceptable definition of the 
essence of virtue (and I do not agree with it), it is clear that the main 
point of his effort in this dialogue is to goad Meno into offering to the 
two of them Meno's own thoughts and words on the nature of virtue. 
Timidity in this regard is no virtue. A refusal by Meno to participate 
(as Anytus later refuses to help) must end the inquiry. It is Meno's 
choice. . 
Initially, it appears that Meno refuses Socrates~ implicit offer to 
teach him, because Meno cannot seem to grasp Socrates' way of asking 
and answering questions. So, even if Meno wants to learn, it is not at 
all clear that he shall be able to learn from Socrates. It seems more 
clear, in fact, that Meno cannot learn from Socrates, because Meno's 
fumbling attempts to answer Socrates' questions come to nothing. In 
contrast, even though the slave-boy does not signal any initial desire to 
learn, he still manages to learn from Socrates because he shows himself 
35. Some time ago, I said the following about this aspect of Socrates' teaching: 
A part of the virtue of Socrates that I see displayed in the Protagoras is his ability 
to call upon his capacity for inquiry in aid of anyone-this seems true friendship 
indeed. He is a stranger to no one deliberately-unless they estrange themselves 
from him or his methods. 
Eisele, Virtue, supra note *, at 498. I made some additional comments about Socrates' openness 
to discussion with anyone, and about his habit of befriending his interlocutors, in Eisele, Speech, 
supra note *, at 264, 267-68. 
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capable of joining in the inquiry with Socrates and responding fruit-
fully to his questions. (In fairness to Meno, however, it might be said 
that Socrates' questions put to Meno, about the nature of virtue, are a 
good deal more d;fficult than Socrates' questions put to the slave-boy, 
about basic arithmetic and certain geometrical figures.) So, as 'sug-
gested in the preceding Section, while "wanting to learn" may be nec-
essary for education to take place, alone it is not sufficient. Wanting to 
learn must also be supplemented with "receptivity" -an openness to or 
welcoming of one's own doubts or quibbles, of someone else's ques-
tions, or perhaps of the world's own mysteries. We then may ask: In 
what does Meno's receptivity consist? How does he manage to join 
together with Socrates to gain and share an education? 
Meno opens the dialogue by asking how virtue is learned or ac-
quired. Socrates suggests that Meno begins with the wrong question. 
In his opening exchange with Meno,36 Socrates claims that in order to 
know the attributes of anything (quaJe), one first must know what the 
thing is, its nature or essence (quid).37 So the primary question be-
comes not how virtue is learned or acquired (as Meno wishes to in-
quire), but rather what virtue is. Socrates' first advice is this: Ask first 
things first. 
Now, it seems possible to question the wisdom and the necessity of 
proceeding as Socrates advises, in part because it is not clear how we 
can determine the essence of an object or of a phenomenon without 
also, simultaneously as it were, determining or knowing its attributes 
or qualities. So Meno's inquiry into one of the attributes of virtue 
(how we learn or acquire it) might well make sense to pursue; at least, 
I do not think that, in the abstract, we can rule it out ab initio. But we 
are not working in the abstract here; instead, we are working in the 
concrete context of this specific dialogue. And, in order to make this 
initial question of Meno's a sensible project of inquiry here and now, 
36. See Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 23-24 (70a-71 b). 
37. ld. at 24 (71b). Eventually, Socrates drops this demand because Meno simply refuses 
to heed it. But Socrates still manages to make the point that, by his lights, this is taking things 
backwards: 
Socrates: Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not have 
inquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascer-
tained "what it is." But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave, 
and never of controlling yourself-such being your notion of freedom-I must 
yield to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to inquire into the 
qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you 
condescend a little and allow the question "Whether virtue is given by instruction, 
or in any other way," to be argued upon hypothesis? 
ld. at 45 (86d-e). This point about taking the relative topics in the wrong order is reiterated by 
Socrates in the very last speech in the dialogue. See id. at 61 (100b). 
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its proponent, Meno, would have to make an argument that would 
take account of Socrates' distinction between quale and quid and 
would have to show Socrates where he is wrong or misguided in his 
assumption (that the essence of a thing must be defined before we can 
learn about its attributes). But Meno makes no such argument. He 
makes no attempt to refute or respond to Socrates' assumption because, 
as his responses to Socrates' opening question reveal, Meno does not 
understand either Socrates' question about the nature of virtue or the 
assumption behind it. 
Meno begins, then, in a state of ignorance-ignorance trebled, re-
ally, because he is ignorant (1) as to Socrates' method of asking ques-
tions, (2) as to the nature of virtue itself, and (3) as to his own igno-
rance about these matters. Meno's main problem is the third point; he 
does not realize that he is ignorant. So Socrates must make Meno's 
ignorance apparent to him, must make it live for him. As Meno's con-
sciousness of his ignorance increases, so too does his receptivity to Soc-
rates' questions (not his responsiveness to those questions, but his re-
ceptivity to the doubt that they express). He entertains them 
more-even if he finds himself less able to answer them. 
The synoptic outline proposed at the beginning of Section I of this 
Essay emphasizes the side of the Meno that involves the education of 
the three different students.38 Yet a slightly different outline of the dia-
logue. would characterize the movement of the Meno in terms of the 
series of stages, or the different turns and developments, in the Socratic 
inquiry that Meno experiences as he is educated into the Socratic 
method. These stages or developments are the following: 
1. The Ethos of Asking and Answering (pp. 23-31 (70a-7 6e» 
2. We Discover Our Own Ignorance-and Disillusionment Ensues 
(pp. 31-36 (77a-80d» 
3. How Is Inquiry into the Unknown Possible? We Must "Re-Col-
lect" Our Knowledge and Use It As Our Guide (pp. 36-45 (80d-
86c» 
4. A Renewal of the Search, a Renewal of Inquiry (pp. 45-49 (86c-
8ge» 
5. When A Student Does Not Wish to Inquire (pp. 49-55 (90a-95a» 
6. Back to the Initial Question: Can Virtue Be Taught? (pp. 55-61 
(95a-100b» 
The first stage in this second outline of the Meno is the stage where 
Socrates tries to teach Meno how to ask and answer questions about 
38. See supra p. 225. 
HeinOnline -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 238 1994-1995
238 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 63 
virtue. Even when Meno seems to get the hang of the technique of 
asking and answering questions in the spirit of Socrates, he does not 
leave the scene, because he still is required by Socrates to give a help-
ful definition of virtue. This is the second stage in Socratic inquiry. 
And at this stage Meno once again fails: he does not manage to give an 
acceptable definition of virtue. When Meno proves unable to do 
this-although Socrates has already shown him how to give an accept-
able definition of figure or shape-Meno sinks into disillusionment. 
Then, at the third stage in the dialogue, Socrates turns to Meno's 
slave-boy, and Socrates takes him through the same process of disillu-
sionment. But the third stage does not stop here, at disillusionment. 
Rather, having shown the slave-boy that he does not know what he 
thinks he knows, Socrates proceeds to show him that he does still know 
enough to enable him (the slave-boy) to answer some of Socrates' ques-
tions about arithmetic and geometric figures. So, Socrates shows the 
slave-boy that he (the boy) has the wherewithal necessary for answer-
ing the questions put to him by Socrates. And this teaches a lesson to 
Meno as well, not only because Meno is an onlooker at this Socratic 
demonstration, but, more importantly, because Meno has been re-
vealed (to himself and to others) to be in the same position as the 
slave-boy. They both must learn to inquire into the matters puzzling 
or confounding them, and their inquiry must come from positions in 
which they have had to admit and express their own ignorance: 
Meno: ... For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do 
not know how to answer yoU. 39 
Boy: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know. 40 
The full lesson is, however, that each of them can go on to inquire, to 
learn, to know, what he needs to know. With resources tested and hope 
renewed, Meno and Socrates return to the hunt for an adequate defini-
tion of the nature and attributes of virtue. 
III. BEGINNING WITH QUESTIONS, SEEKING DEFINITIVE ANSWERS 
Socratic questioning pursues a very deliberate and careful progres-
sion, from doubt to doubt and question to question, leading to disillu-
sionment, then leading out of disillusionment into renewal. I now want 
to trace more specifically some of the steps in this Socratic progression, 
starting at the beginning of the dialogue. 
39. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 35-36 (SOb). 
40. Id. at 41 (S4a). 
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Meno's opening question to Socrates assumes that both of them al-
ready know what virtue is (Socrates' "quid"), and now Meno is sim-
ply asking Socrates to explain to him one of the attributes of virtue 
(Socrates' "quale"): Namely, is virtue gained by teaching or is it in-
stead a natural acquisition? Socrates sees the assumption implicit in 
Meno's question and tries to get Meno to see it too. Socrates does not 
think that he himself knows what virtue is and, furthermore, does not 
think that Meno knows either: 
And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as 
poor as the rest of the world, and I confess with shame that I know 
literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not know the "quid" of 
anything, how can I know the "quale"? ... Not only that, my dear 
boy, but you may say further that I have never known of anyone else 
who did, in my judgment.41 
In the face of this challenge, Meno ignores the assumption implicit 
in Socrates' distinction between quale and quid (about which, as I said 
above, Meno might have effectively challenged Socrates), and he in-
stead simply proclaims that both Gorgias and he know what virtue is. 
Socrates remains skeptical of this claim, but urges Meno to prove him 
wrong: 
By the gods, Meno, be generous and tell me what you say that virtue 
is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, 
and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge [of what 
virtue is], although I have been just saying that I have never found 
anybody who had.42 
Meno's response to Socrates is arrogance itself: "There will be no 
difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the 
virtue of a man .... "48 But Socrates rejects Meno's attempted defini-
tion of virtue, because it purports to define what virtue is in various 
entities, while it fails to state what virtue is in and of itself. "How 
fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me 
with a swarm of them, which are in your keeping."44 
After Socrates' rejection of Meno's attempted definition, it dawns on 
Meno that perhaps he does not know what he thinks h~ knows, that 
perhaps he does not understand quite as much as he thinks he does, 
about the nature of virtue. The specific doubt that Meno expresses, 
however, is that he does not yet fully grasp Socrates' question: "I am 
beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question 
41. Id. at 23-24 (71 b-c). 
42. Id. at 24 (71 d). 
43. Id. (71 e). 
44. Id. at 25 (72a). 
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as I could wish."4Ci This is only the beginning of doubt dawning on 
Meno, and all that he announces is his doubt about whether he under-
stands Socrates' question. Meno does not say that, due to Socrates' 
questioning, he now doubts whether he understands what virtue is. 
That second doubt will come later, but it takes several more passes at 
the question, at Socrates' challenge to Meno (to tell him what virtue 
is), before Meno comes to realize that he does not know how to answer 
Socrates' questions. And it is only after that realization, some pages 
farther along, that Meno comes to realize that perhaps he does not 
even know what virtue is. 
Having humbled Meno, Socrates tries to show him what kind of 
questions he is asking and how they might be answered. 
Socrates: ... Could you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that 
you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to the 
answer about virtue. 
Meno: I would rather that you answer, Socrates. 
Socrates: Shall I indulge you? 
Meno: By all means. 
Socrates: And then you will tell me about virtue? 
Meno: I will. 
Socrates: Then I must d~ my best, for there is a prize to be won.48 
Socrates: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old 
man to give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of 
remembering what is Gorgias' definition of virtue. 
Meno: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates!7 
It is only at this point in the dialogue, a half-dozen pages into it, that 
Meno begins to understand that Socrates' questions are different from 
the question with which Meno began. He is beginning to gain an ap-
preciation of the precision of Socratic questioning and the elusiveness 
of Socratic definitions (which are what Socrates expects as useful an-
swers to his questions). 
Since Socrates seems to think that these kinds of questions can have 
satisfactory answers and that such answers come in the form of defini-
tions, definitions are what he seeks from Meno, and they are the type 
of answer that Socrates himself tries to supply.48 Socrates mayor may 
45. [d. (72d). 
46. [d. at 29 (75a-b). 
47. [d. at 30 (76a-b). 
48. Socrates (or perhaps it is Plato) seems to assume that our knowledge of some-
thing-here, virtue-is or should always be expressible in the form of a definition. If we truly 
know what x is, then we should be able to define x. Consequently, Socrates' characteristic 
questions are requests for definitions (of virtue, of courage, of prudence, of piety, of wisdom, of 
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not be well-advised to seek definitions in answer to the kind of ques-
tions that he entertains. The more important point for us to see, how-
ever, is that Socrates' search for definitions is opposed to the kind of 
answer that the Sophists offer: a bold and grandiose rhetorical flourish 
that tells us nothing, that only pretends to be based in knowledge or 
wisdom. Socrates realizes that Meno expected his original question to 
have an answer of the kind that Gorgias has taught him to expect. 
"[Gorgias] has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand 
and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in 
which he himself answers all comers."49 But Socrates teaches Meno 
that this is a mistaken expectation, because it settles for an answer that 
is useless or uninformative. (This is an example of what I meant ear-
lier when I said that a teacher teaches a sense of propriety, one that, 
among other things, assesses the value and the utility of the answers 
that a person finds acceptable or that he or she settles for. 50) 
The difference between Socrates' way of answering and Gorgias' 
way of answering is illustrated when Socrates offers Meno a definition 
of "what figure [or shape] is."&l Meno finds Socrates' definition ludi-
crously simple, lacking profundity or philosophical seriousness. This is 
a part of Meno's ignorance, however, as Socrates goes on to show 
Meno. When Socrates proposes a different answer to the question, 
"What is figure?" (an answer formulated in the style of answer given 
by Gorgias), Meno shouts his approval. "That, Socrates, appears to 
me to be an admirable answer."52 But Socrates denies the worth of the 
answer he has just produced. Such an answer may be comforting to 
justice, of knowledge, and so forth). 
This is not how 1 proceed in law school, nor is it (I believe) how most of us teach in law 
school. My own practice does sometimes rely upon a request for a definition, granted: How are 
we to understand "possession," or "reasonable," or "reliance" (and so forth) here? But, more 
often, 1 test the knowledge of my students either by asking them to describe a case, a legal rule, 
or a statute, or by asking them to explain one. And asking for such descriptions and explana-
tions is not tantamount to a request for a definition. Nonetheless, 1 think that such descriptions 
and explanations do (sometimes) adequately express the knowledge that we possess of these 
matters, of the law (and its workings). 
This does not respond fully to Socrates' assumption that our knowledge of such matters can 
be expressed in definitions, of course, but 1 think that it suggests one possible line of response 
that might be successfully developed. The entire topic of the nature of Socrates' questions and 
what he meant to elicit by asking them is worth further study. Beginnings on this topic have 
been made as follows: GERASIMOS X. SANTAS, SOCRATES: PHILOSOPHY IN PLATO'S EARLY 
DIALOGUES 59-96 (1979); GREGORY VLASTOS, What did Socrates Understand by His "What 
is F ?" Question?, in PLATONIC STUDIES 410, 410-17 (2d ed. 1981). As to the topic of how our 
knowledge of certain matters can be expressed, see infra notes 59, 61. 
49. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 23 (70b-c). 
50. See supra pp. 228-29. 
51. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 29 (7Sb). 
52. Id. at 31 (76d). 
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Meno, but that is because it fits his preconception of what such an 
answer should look or sound like. T~at is why Meno accepts it, not 
because it is true or useful. 
Socrates: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and 
therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer [that 
Socrates offered] about figure. 
Meno: Yes. 
Socrates: And yet, ... I cannot help thinking that the other [answer] 
was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion 
if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as 
you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.1I8 
The surprise is that Meno does stay, and he is initiated into the intri-
cacies of the Socratic method. It is a method that depends, at one and 
the same time, on disillusionment and something else again. 
IV. FIRST COMES DISILLUSIONMENT: MENO AND THE SLAVE-Boy 
The first twenty pages of the Meno trace a deepening puzzlement 
on the part of Meno, as he is initiated into the intricacies of Socratic 
questioning. This puzzlement eventuates in Meno's disillusionment. 
But Socrates does not end his teaching there. He goes on, rather, to 
duplicate this disillusionment in Meno's slave-boy (thereby showing 
Meno that we all-the high, the low, and the middle-share this as-
pect of the human condition), and then he further shows both Meno 
and the slave-boy a way out of their disillusionment, by means of their 
own knowledge and know-how (such as they are, such as they stand). 
And this last lesson teaches the same moral as the first, namely, that 
we all-the high, the low, and the middle-share this aspect of the 
human condition. So, both the disillusionment and the know-how 
shared by Meno and the slave-boy simultaneously name human threats 
and human promises: they negatively threaten us with all of the 
problems associated with human limitation and failure, and yet they 
also positively promise us the powers associated with human possibility 
and capacity. How are we to negotiate this treacherous terrain? Socra-
tes does it by discussing these problems with others, by inquiring into 
these matters in the company of another. 
When two go together in the course of Socratic inquiry, we find out 
what they share. What human beings share, basically, is their igno-
rance and an ability to overcome it, an ability to learn (not an ability 
to learn everything they want to learn, but perhaps to learn whatever 
53. Id. at 31 (76e). 
HeinOnline -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 243 1994-1995
1994) POVER TY OF SOCRA TIC QUESTIONING 243 
they may need to know). It is the peculiar genius of the early and 
middle dialogues of Plato, which I think portray Socrates at his best, 
that they teach two interrelated lessons about human ignorance and 
limitation: 
1. You do not know what you' think you know. 
2. You know more (or other) than what you think (you know).114 
The first lesson is a lesson in disillusionment, as I understand it, be-
cause it typically concerns a matter about which we all seemingly 
know, or should know. How is it that we do not in fact know-as 
Socrates keeps showing us, and then reminding us-something that we 
think we should (or do) know? It is disillusioning to conjure up such a 
question. But the other side of Socrates' teaching is that, given an 
awareness of our ignorance, we also must acknowledge that we do in 
fact know more (or other) than what we think we know. So there is 
hope for us yet; and this I take to be Socrates' second lesson, the 
"something else" he offers us. 
L~t us begin with the first lesson that Socrates teaches: we do not 
know what we think we know. I said that this discovery leads to disil-
lusionment. It is disillusioning to learn that something that we think 
we know and perhaps even think to be a matter of common knowl-
edge--an epistemological possession that we share in common-is, in 
fact, something that we do not know at all. Typically, in the early and 
middle dialogues, Socrates orchestrates this insight by claiming not to 
know about a given phenomenon, whereas Socrates' interlocutor or 
student claims to know all about that same phenomenon. Then, when 
Socrates shows his interlocutor that he (the interlocutor) does not know 
any more or any better than Socrates, the two of them are reduced to 
the same position or status, namely, that of not knowing. They have 
achieved Socratic ignorance. So the operative Socratic insight is that we 
all start from ignorance. 
But the Socratic position for the initiation of inquiry is not only one 
of not knowing, but also one of wanting to know, wanting to learn. 
With the aid of Socrates' preparation by means of intense questioning, 
we are confused or. perplexed about something in the world, in others, 
or in ourselves, or for some other reason we are interested in some-
thing, and this propels us into taking an interest in the matter at hand, 
prompting us to inquire into it. So, for example, when Meno begins by 
asking Socrates a question about an attribute of virtue, he suggests 
54. These two lessons of Socratic teaching are the twin themes of my companion essay. For 
a further development of these twin themes and a more explicit connection of them to law school 
teaching today, see Eisele, supra note 2, at 603-19. 
HeinOnline -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 244 1994-1995
244 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 63 
(and he thinks) that he knows what virtue is. And when Socrates ends 
his response by saying that neither he nor anyone else that he has ever 
met knows what virtue is, this astonishes Meno. But when Meno's 
efforts to disprove Socrates are all rejected, with what appear to 
Meno's satisfaction to be good reasons for rejection, this shakes Meno's 
confidence. It is meant to do so, of course, because Socrates is trying to 
show Meno that his confidence in his own knowledge-in his claim to 
know what virtue is-is misplaced. Socrates accomplishes this revela-
tion by revealing Meno's own confusion or perplexity: Socrates shows 
Meno the confusion that exists in Meno's own mind and in his many 
attempted definitions of virtue. By asking Meno apparently simple and 
straightforward questions that he is unable to answer, questions that 
Meno himself feels to be fair, ones that he feels he should be able to 
answer if he truly does know what virtue is, Socrates reveals to Meno 
his own confusion and perplexity. Meno thought that he knew what 
virtue was, but it turns out that he did not. 
The maxim found at the Delphic oracle, "Know thyself,"66 is more 
complicated to apply and more difficult to honor in practice than we 
might believe. As to Meno, this Delphic injunction prescribes a three-
part project, because Meno begins with his ignorance "trebled":66 (1) 
He is ignorant as to the nature of Socratic questions and how they 
need to be answered (or the kind of answer that they expect or re-
quire); (2) he also is ignorant as to the nature or essence of virtue-at 
least he is unable to produce a definition of virtue that Socrates and he 
55. It is reported that this saying was inscribed over the threshold of the temple at Delphi: 
[AJt Delphi the educational power of Greek religion reached its maximum, and 
spread from there far beyond the frontiers of Hellas. The wise sayings of sages 
were dedicated to Apollo and inscribed in his temple, since their worldly wisdom 
was only a reflection of his divine wisdom. And at his door his worshippers saw 
the command Know thyself-the doctrine of sophrosyne, by which men learn to 
remember the limits of human power and ambition, expressed in the legislative 
form that was characteristic of the age. 
1 WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE 167 (Gilbert Highet trans., 2d 
ed. 1945) (footnote omitted). 
In The Apology, Socrates justifies his teaching method in part by saying that he was told 
that the Delphic orade said that no one was wiser than Socrates. See PLATO, supra note 22, at 
25 (21a). Yet Socrates knew that he did not know. Putting these together-he knew himself 
well enough to know that he was ignorant, and the oracle said that no one was wiser than 
he---'this seems to mean (and meant to Socrates) that all of his interlocutors failed to know what 
they thought they knew. So Socrates takes as one of his purposes in life the effort to show others 
that they do not know what they think they know. 
The Delphic saying, "Know thyself," also comes under Socratic scrutiny in the Charmides 
and the Protagoras. See PLATO, Charmides, in LACHES AND CHARMIDES 51, 76, 80 (165a, 
167a) (Rosamond Kent Sprague trans., Library of Liberal Arts 1973); PLATO, PROTAGORAS 46 
(343b) (Benjamin Jowett & Martin Ostwald trans., Library of Liberal Arts 1956). 
56. See supra p. 237. 
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can accept as satisfactory or adequate; and (3) he does not know ini-
tially that he is ignorant in either of these respects. 
Socrates' insistence on the idea that any object or phenomenon has a 
defining nature or essence, and that we must be able to state a defini-
tion of that nature or essence if we claim to know what it is (or, more 
positively, if we ever are truly to know what the nature or essence of 
the object or phenomenon is), is the anvil on which Meno's arrogance 
is crushed: 
Socrates: ... Why, did I not ask you to tell me the nature of virtue 
as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this, but declare 
every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue, as 
though you had told me and I must already know the whole of vir-
tue, and this, too, when frittered away into little pieces. And, there-
fore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the 
same question: What is virtue?1I7 
It is Meno's continued claim to know the nature of virtue, and yet his 
continued inability to articulate a definition that satisfies either Socra-
tes or himself, one that holds up under their combined critical inspec-
tion, that reduces Meno to disillusionment. He fails to support his 
claim to know, because he does not know what he thinks he knows. 
His recognition of this fact leads to frustration and disillusionment, 
expressed this way: 
Socrates: Then begin again, and answer me. What, according to you 
and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue? 
Men 0: 0 Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you 
were always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now 
you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting be-
witched and enchanted, and am at my wit's end. And if I may ven-
ture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appear-
ance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo 
fish, who torpifies [stuns, numbs] those who come near him and 
touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and 
my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; 
and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches 
[by the Sophists] about virtue before now, and to many persons-and 
very good ones they were, as I thought-at this moment I cannot 
even say what virtue is. liS 
Not every failure of knowledge leads to disillusionment. But once 
Meno thinks that he has understood Socrates' question, and then 
gamely tries to comply with the demand for a definition, Meno seems 
57. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 35 (79d-e). 
58. Id. at 35-36 (7ge-80b). 
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to be in the best possible position to succeed. He knows what is now 
being asked of him, he knows the phenomenon in question, and still he 
finds himself unable to say what virtue is! Well, that refutation pro-
duces more than mere discouragement. It makes a person feel that he 
or she just does not know what he or she claims to know. (It may even 
make a person skeptical of anyone's claim to know anything at all; this 
is how skepticism gets started:19) For someone in the position of Meno, 
who has claimed to know what virtue is and has claimed to understand 
what Socrates is asking, the result of this entire process is 
disillusionment. 
Meno's word for disillusionment is "torpification,"60 which is un-
usual, but I think that one can see the kind of experience that he is 
trying to capture. He feels as though Socrates has cast a spell over 
him; he feels bewitched and enchanted; he is at his wit's end. In a 
sense, he still knows that he knows what virtue is (or he still thinks 
that he knows what virtue is), and yet he always seems to find himself 
unable to say what it is, to express the knowledge that he has (or 
thinks he has).61 This makes him too numb to think or speak. And 
59. Why, in such circumstances, do we not think instead that perhaps virtue cannot be 
known or described as we seem to think or to assume that it can? In this sense, virtue may not 
be defined as we seem to think of its being defined; yet perhaps in another sense it can be 
known or described. (I have said more about the possibility of Socratic definition, and of other 
types of definition, in Eisele, Virtue, supra note *, at 498-501.) 
We do not take this alternative route because, I suppose, it seems so obvious to us that we 
do know what virtue is, and equally obvious what this knowledge consists in and how to go 
about defining or expressing it. Wittgenstein, for one, is at pains to get us to consider the road 
not taken. His entire programme of explicating our shared knowledge by means of the criteria 
we possess and the grammatical structure or schema that those criteria trace, is aimed at making 
available to us-making us conscious of-the knowledge that we actually possess and how (the 
sense in which) we actually possess it. Places to begin reading in this alternative vision of our 
knowledge include the following: CAVELL, supra note 23; LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CER-
TAINTY (Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILO-
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 78,90,147-51,371-74 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968). 
For further remarks on disillusionment and skepticism, see Eisele, supra note 2, at 602, 613. 
60. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that "torpification" is Jowett's word for translating 
Meno's experience. The other three translators of the Meno whose translations I have consulted 
instead speak of Meno's "perplexity" and the fact that Socrates' questioning makes him 
"numb." (These translators do also speak, however, in terms of Meno's being "bewitched" and 
"beguiled," in terms of "magic" and "witchcraft," and in terms of "enchantment.") See Allen, 
supra note 3, at 162; Grube, supra note 3, at 12-13; Brown & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 30-31. 
61. Perhaps the classic formulation of this perplexity-thinking that one knows, but also, 
at the same time; doubting that one knows or fearing that one does not know-is St. Augus-
tine's. In his Confessions, he voices the dilemma this way: 
What is time? Who can easily and briefly explain this? Who can comprehend this 
even in thought, so as to express it in a word? Yet what do we discuss more 
familiarly and knowingly in conversation than time? Surely we understand it 
when we talk about it, and also understand it when we hear others talk about it. 
What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to 
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then the disillusionment comes. He not only does not know what to say 
("For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know 
how to answer you"); he no longer knows whether he even knows 
what virtue is ("at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is"). He 
is full of doubt. 
This makes two of them. In announcing that he now doubts whether 
he knows what virtue is, Meno has only arrived at the same position of 
ignorance already reached and acknowledged by Socrates at the begin-
ning of the dialogue. "And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region 
of poverty, am as poor as the rest of the world, and I confess with 
shame that I know literally nothing about virtue."82 The shame in 
Socrates' confession of his ignorance is an expression of the sheer fact 
that he knows nothing about virtue. He has no excuse for his igno-. 
rance, because he has had the time and the ability to find out what he 
needs to know about virtue. But beyond this expression, there is no 
shame in Socrates' admission; it is this very recognition of one's own 
ignorance (an admission or recognition that paradoxically announces 
an increase in one's self-knowledge) that makes possible whatever 
knowledge, or progress toward knowledge, any subsequent inquiry 
may achieve. 
Socrates insists on this need to recognize one's own ignorance as the 
pre-condition to joining Meno in an inquiry into the nature of virtue. 
And, since Meno now shares Socrates' perplexity and his admitted ig-
norance on the topic of virtue, perhaps they are prepared to inquire 
further, together: 
Socrates: . . . As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as 
well as the cause of torpidity [numbness, perplexity] in others, then 
indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex others, not 
because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. And 
now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case, 
although you did once perhaps know, before you touched me. How-
someone who does ask me, I do not know .... 
ST. AUGUSTINE. THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 287 Oohn K. Ryan trans., Image 
Books 1960) (Book XI, ch. 14, ~ a-b). 
So long as you do not ask me to articulate my knowledge, I know it. But as soon as you put 
me on the spot, I lose my knowledge of it. How can our knowledge be so fleeting, so fragile, so 
unavailable when we most need it? So it is that disillusionment with human knowledge seems to 
alternate with a pugnacious willfulness that one still knows what he or she claims to know 
(thereby expressing our unwillingness to acknowledge our limits, or our ignorance). Wittgen-
stein and Cavell both comment helpfully on St. Augustine's expression of this phenomenon. See 
STANLEY CAVELL, Ending the Waiting Game, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 115, 126 
(1969); WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 59, at § 89; see also 
supra note 48. 
62. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 23 (71b). 
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ever, I have no objection to join with you in the inquiry.s3 
Socrates recognizes that he shares the ignorance common to all human 
beings (hence, his avowal that "I am utterly perplexed myself' and 
that "you [Meno] seem to be in the same case"): their condition is a 
shared one. To call this condition "ignorance" is slightly misleading, 
because ·it is as much a kind of knowledge as it is a lack of knowledge. 
Because of the truthfulness and candor of Socrates' questioning and his 
willingness to admit his own ignorance, he reveals to himself and to 
others a perplexity that already existed, a confusion that existed but 
that heretofore had gone unknown or unacknowledged. This realiza-
tion is a kind of knowledge, not ignorance. Meno, for example, is now 
conscious of his ignorance and seems to be able to admit it in front of 
others. Whereas before he thought that he knew what virtue was, but 
apparently did not know, now he at least knows that he does not know 
(what virtue is). So, by learning the limits of his knowledge, he has 
gained something valuable. He has gained knowledge (about himself) 
by learning where his knowledge ends. And it is exactly such knowl-
edge of one's ignorance that Socrates finds energizing, or empowering. 
Meno's slave-boy gains knowledge of his own ignorance by means of 
the same treatment from Socrates that Meno received: questioning 
leading to perplexity; confusion leading to the slave-boy's tenuous 
claim to know something; refutation of the boy's claim leading to his 
disillusionment. In the following, Socrates summarizes the boy's educa-
tional initiation into disillusionment and what it has gained him: 
Socrates: Do you see, Meno, what advances he [the slave-boy] has 
made in his power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he 
does not know now, what is the side of a figure of eight feet; but then 
he thought that he knew, and answered confidently as if he knew, 
and had no difficulty; now he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor 
fancies that he knows. 
MenD: True. 
Socrates: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance? 
Meno: I think that he is. 
Socrates: If we have made him doubt, and given him the "torpedo's 
shock," have we done him any harm? 
MenD: I think not. 
Socrates: We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some 
degree to the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy 
his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world 
again and again that the double space should have a double side. 
MenD: True. 
63. Id. at 36 (SOc-d). 
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Socrates: But do you suppose that he would ever have inquired into 
or learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really igno-
rant of it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he 
did not know, and desired to know? 
MenD: I think not, Socrates. 
Socrates: Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch? 
MenD: I think SO.64 
249 
Socrates' claim is that the slave-boy would never have been moved to 
inquire into these matters of geometry and mathematical knowledge, 
had it not been for "Socrates. He led the boy to confront and to ac-
knowledge his own ignorance in such matters. It is this confrontation 
that generates the desire to know or the "wanting to know" that ear-
lier I said is an essential element in making this inquiry possible, and 
effective.611 So, it seems that Meno and his slave-boy find, just as Soc-
rates does, the knowledge of their own ignorance to be energizing, or 
empowering. 
V. RECOLLECTION AS THE RESPONSE TO DISILLUSIONMENT 
If the knowledge of one's own ignorance prepares the stage for fur-
ther Socratic inquiry, prepares one to inquire further into the myster-
ies with which we are perplexed, this is only half of the story. As I 
said above, Socrates offers us dual lessons, only one of which is our 
disillusionment with our own ignorance.66 Disillusionment is hardly 
apt to motivate us to inquire further-it implies despair,67 not invigo-
ration, and, if left alone, it leads not to inquiry but to a kind of 
Thoreauvian "quiet desperation."68 For, if we prove ignorant of things 
that we (used to) think common knowledge, what point is there in 
64. ld. at 41-42 (84a-c). 
65. See supra pp. 227-30, 236, 243. 
66. See supra p. 243. 
67. That the meaning of disillusionment contains complicated negative and positive conno-
tations is a topic I discuss more fully in my companion essay. See Eisele, supra note 2, at 612. (I 
want to thank Professor Thomas Shaffer for convincing me that this complexity needs to be 
handled with more care than I had initially given it.) 
68. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walden, in A WEEK ON THE CONCORD AND MERRI-
MACK RIVERS[;) WALDEN; OR, LIFE IN THE WOODS[;) THE MAINE WOODS[; AND) CAPE COD 
329 (ch. I, 11 9) (Robert F. Sayre ed., Library of Am. 1985) (1854). 
ld. 
The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation. What is called resignation is 
confirmed desperation. From the desperate city you go into the desperate country, 
and have to console yourself with the bravery of minks and muskrats. A stereo-
typed but unconscious despair is concealed even under what are called the games 
and amusements of mankind. There is no play in them, for this comes after work. 
But it is a characteristic of wisdom not to do desperate things. 
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undertaking further inquiry? What point is there in trying to improve 
ourselves or our knowledge, when it seems so desperately out of our 
reach? 
This is what Meno would like to know, and he expresses this point 
after Socrates has led him to disillusionment. "And how will you in-
quire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put 
forth as the subject of inquiry? And if you find what you want, how 
will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know?"69 
Faced with their joint perplexity, what are they t~ do? Meno wants to 
give up, because he thinks that it is impossible to learn what they wish 
to learn-the nature of virtue. How can we know what we are looking 
for-much less recognize it if and when we find it-when we do not 
know in the first place what it is (what its nature or essence is)? It is 
this challenge from Meno that launches Socrates into his celebrated 
discussion with Meno's slave-boy. . 
The therapy for disillusionment, according to Socrates, is recollec-
tion, and his discussion with the slave-boy is frequently cited as an 
early expression of Plato's doctrine of "recollection." This Platonic 
doctrine attempts to explain how the immortal soul can first possess 
and then recollect knowledge that it has acquired in its earlier exis-
tence and acquaintance with the world (and with the Forms): 
Socrates: ... The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been 
born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether 
in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and 
it is no wonder that she [the soul] should be able to call to remem-
brance all that she ever knew about virtue and about everything; for 
as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no 
difficulty in her eliciting, or as men say "learning," out of a single 
recollection, all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for 
all inquiry and all learning is but recollection.70 
I can best make sense out of the claim that "all inquiry and all learn-
ing is but recollection" by understanding it, not as it may fit or illus-
trate one of Plato's metaphysical doctrines, but rather as a trope, a 
figure of speech, meant to capture the sense and extent to which our 
knowledge of any matter comes from the human activity of reconstruct-
ing or recapturing it (recounting it, or re-collecting it) from our own 
experience. 
69. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 36 (80d). Meno's question, which many have 
called a paradox, has received considerable attention in the secondary literature on Socrates and 
Plato. For starters, I recommend the following two essays: Bernard Phillips, The Significance of 
Meno's Paradox, in PLATO'S MENO: TEXT AND CRITICISM 77 (Alexander Sesonske & Noel 
Fleming eds., 1965); Michael Welbourne, Meno's Paradox, 61 PHILOSOPHY 229 (1986). 
70. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 37 (81c-d). 
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To begin with, it is important to remember that Socrates and his 
interlocutors investigate matters of common knowledge, objects or phe-
nomena that are constituents of our ordinary experience and language: 
virtue, knowledge, belief, courage, wisdom, piety, power, justice, edu-
cation, and so on. These are shared by all human beings, and this 
sharing is a part of what makes them appropriate subjects for philo-
sophical inquiry (Socratic inquiry). As to matters of common knowl-
edge or experience, Wittgenstein said: "[I]t is ... of the essence of our 
investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want 
to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what 
we seem in some sense not to understand."71 This is not the most 
transparent comment ever made on philosophical method, but I under-
stand its denial of wanting to learn anything "new" to be a way of 
forcing us to face what we share in our experience and life. We are, 
that is, to try to engage with this common experience first, rather than 
always to look for something else that supposedly underlies or explains 
the initial phenomenon confronting us. 
In philosophies that proceed on the basis of ordinary language and 
experience (as Wittgenstein's and Socrates' philosophies do), looking 
always at what we s~y and feel and think and claim as the primary 
data with which philosophy has to work (as, emphatically, Socratic 
inquiry does), we are not trying to seek some e,xplanation of these data 
that appeals to anything outside of them or underlying them (as 
though we normally have access to such external causes or underlying 
structures). We seek, instead, to understand the data that themselves 
constitute our lives, our world, our minds, our ideas and ideals. These 
are what we find ourselves in confusion or perplexity over. Philosophi-
cal confusion concerns what we make of our own experience and our 
own world (or, more typically, what we fail to make of them), and in 
this respect, it makes no sense to attempt to understand our concep-
tions about (or our confusions over) our ordinary experience and world 
by going outside of them (or behind them, or beneath them). Such 
alternatives postpone these problems or substitute new problems for 
old ones; they do not solve the problems with which we begin (the ones 
that initially motivated us and our philosophical inquiry) and from 
which we possibly never rid ourselves: These old problems are the ones 
about which Stanley Cavell speaks in the motto to this Essay: . 
things that ordinary human beings cannot help thinking about, or 
anyway cannot help having occur to them, sometimes in fantasy, 
sometimes as a flash across a landscape; such things, for example, as 
71. Wn'TGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. supra note 59, at § 89, ~ b. 
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whether we can know the world as it is in itself, or whether others 
really know the nature of one's own experiences, or whether good 
and bad are relative, or whether we might not now be dreaming that 
we are awake.72 
So we want to make sense out of the very data of our consciousness or 
experience. 
We mayor may not already have enough data of this kind;73 some-
times Wittgensteinian or Socratic investigations seek additional data, 
sometimes a re-organization or re-assessment of the old data. But the 
philosophical problem remains that we do not yet understand the data 
that we already have-we experience these things, but we do not yet 
understand them. Paradoxically, they are ours, but they are not ours. 
We "have" them, but we do not yet "possess" them in a firm or clear 
mental grasp. What we seek in a philosophical investigation inspired 
in a Socratic or Wittgensteinian mood is a better view of, a better un-
derstanding of, the experiential data that we already have. 
In this respect, Socrates' call to remembrance, to recollect something 
that we already know-in the sense that we are already familiar with 
it, although we do not yet know it, because we do not yet appreciate it 
or its significance--is a call to make ourselve1 aware of something 
about which we are not yet as conscious as we should be. Such a con-
ception of the philosopher's task pictures us as being in need of com-
ing-to-our-senses; this is the essence of Socratic inquiry. So, disillusion-
ment is meant to lead to recollection. 
VI. WORKING WITH WHAT WE HAVE: THE EXAMPLE OF THE 
SLAVE-Boy 
The slave-boy is chosen from several attendants accompanying 
Meno, and his only attributes about which Socrates asks are his nativ-
ity and his native language. "He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he 
not?"7. These are all the tools, all the capacities, that Socrates requires 
of him: he needs only to be a native speaker of this natural language. 
In the exchange between Socrates and the slave-boy, there are at issue 
72. CAVELL, supra note 1, at 9. 
73. This is to say that we have all the data that we need in our own lives and experiences; 
nothing more exotic or esoteric need be sought (as Wittgenstein says, see supra note 71. and 
accompanying text). But this is not to say that philosophy as a discipline or tradition has always 
made use of these data. The fact that traditional philosophy has not, in fact, made use of the 
data available to it is one of the insights stated and demonstrated in J.L. Austin's work. See, 
e.g., J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 123, 128-37 0.0. Urmson & 
G.J. Warnock eds., 1961). 
74. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 38 (82b). 
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certain matters of basic mathematical knowledge, concepts of arithme-
tic and geometry that seem to be among the common inheritance of all 
human beings. But, just as Socrates' method of questioning the slave-
boy is similar to that used by Socrates on Meno, the end result is simi-
lar too: the boy is refuted in his claim to know. This explicit parallel 
in the dialogue-between Meno's fate and the slave-boy's fate at the 
hands of Socrates and his questioning-seems to me intended to teach 
the lesson that Meno and the slave-boy are basically in the same posi-
tion, one of unconscious ignorance, of which each is made aware by 
means of Socrates' questions. 
The exchange between Socrates and the slave-boy begins as follows: 
Socrates: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a 
square? 
Boy: I do. 
Socrates: And you know that a square figure has these four lines 
equal? 
Boy: Certainly. 
Socrates: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of 
the square are also equal? 
Boy: Yes. 
Socrates: A square may be of any size? 
Boy: Certainly.711 
This is tepid stuff, and it continues in pretty much the same vein, ex-
cept that the slave-boy gradually comes to speak a little more, to give 
some answers that require a bit more calculation or thinking. 
Socrates: And how many are twice two feet? Count and tell me. 
Boy: Four, Socrates. 
Socrates: And might there not be another square twice as large as 
this, and having like this' the lines equal? 
Boy: Yes. 
Socrates.: And of how many feet will that be? 
Boy: Of eight feet. 
Socrates: And now try and tell the length of the line which forms the 
side of that double square: this is two feet-what will that be? 
Boy: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double. 
Socrates: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy any-
thing, but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he 
knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of 
eight square feet; does he not ?78 
Reading this exchange, I cannot agree with Socrates' account of 
750 Ido at 38 (82b-c)0 
760 Ido at 39 (82d-e)0 
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what is happening here: "I am not teaching the boy anything, but only 
asking him questions .... " Socrates is asking the slave-boy what law-
yers would call Jeading questions (the questions suggest the answers 
that the questioner wishes the answerer to give), and the slave-boy 
answers with a few words, essentially expressing his assent to what 
Socrates has said. This shows nothing about the soul's recollection of 
prior knowledge (and very few readers take it to do SO).77 What it does 
show, however, is Socrates teaching the slave-boy about two different 
kinds of knowledge that he possesses (without knowing it). 
First, Socrates is making explicit to the slave-boy certain implica-
tions of arithmetic and geometrical figures, implications that follow 
from the mathematical knowledge that the boy has (as stated or ex-
pressed in the propositions that Socrates puts to him).78 For example, 
77. In his collection of essays on the Meno, Malcolm Brown says that there is "nearly 
universal doubt about ... [whether) Socrates' interrogation [is) fair, or ... [instead, whether) it 
resort[s) to questions 'blatantly leading'." Brown & Guthrie, supra note 3, at xv. Brown goes on 
to ask: "[E)ven if it was fair, does the lesson support the momentous consequences (about the 
soul's ante-natal condition, about recollection) that Plato seems to be attaching to it?" Id. 
On the other side, Professor Allen suggests that the charge of "asking leading questions" is 
unfairly made against Socrates: 
It is often objected that Socrates' questions to the slave are leading questions, 
and thus his example in no way indicates that learning is recollection. But this 
objection is confused. A leading question is one which suggests its own answer, 
and so defined, many of Socrates' questions are clearly leading. But it is relevant 
to observe that, in matters mathematical, the mind of the boy is capable of being 
led. In the law of evidence, which deals with empirical fact, leading questions are 
open to objection on the ground that they may cause a witness to acquiesce in a 
false suggestion. But this is clearly irrelevant when questions deal with a complex 
geometrical proof. No false suggestions have been planted; the evidentiary problem 
does not arise. 
Allen, supra note 3, at 143. Professor Allen may be right in so far as his answer goes, but does 
it go far enough? The problem with using leading questions in this context is not that Socrates 
might mislead the slave-boy into acquiescing in a false suggestion that the slave-boy might not 
otherwise accept. That is, 'we are not trying to protect the slave-boy here from having this 
threatened "acquiescence" held against him, as might occur in a court of law regarding an 
"admission against interest" that a party in the slave-boy's position might make. Rather, we are 
trying to determine whether the answers that the slave-boy gives in response to Socrates' ques-
tions are produced by the boy because he, in fact, possesses some inherent knowledge of these 
matters, or instead are produced because he is merely facile enough to read and reproduce the 
answers suggested to him by Socrates' "leading" questions. As to this latter concern, I do not see 
that Professor Allen's response is satisfactory. 
How we are to understand Socrates' interrogation of the slave-boy remains problematic, as 
does its relation to the more general theme of learning and recollection. Interested readers might 
wish to consult the following: Malcolm Brown, Plato Disapproves of the Slave-Boy's Answer, in 
Brown & Guthrie, supra note 3, at 198, 198-242; Julius Moravcsik, Learning as Recollection, 
in 1 PLATO: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 53, 53-69 (Gregory Vlastos ed., 1971); 
Gregory Vlastos, Anamnesis in the Meno, 4 DIALOGUE 143 (1965). 
78. Again, Professor Allen has a helpful comment: 
[I)f learning and inquiry are recollection, then to inquire is to bring to explicit 
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when the boy says, in response to one of Socrates' formulations, "That 
is evident,"79 I find myself wanting to add: Now it is evident to you 
awareness what is already implicitly known. If this is true, the primary function 
of education and teaching is not to impart information, but to rid the soul of false 
beliefs which cloud vision and cause blindness; if the doctrine of Recollection is 
true, education in some primary sense is a process of refutation, and inherently 
Socratic. 
Allen, supra note 3, at 142. Allen's suggestion is that learning and inquiry, from Socrates' 
perspective, are inextricably connected to both the negative use of elenchus and the positive use 
of recollection. I agree and said so earlier. See supra note 31. But this claim still stands in need 
of some additional comment. 
The Socratic method of inquiry consists of many activities: asking for definitions, hypothe-
sizing cases, investigating examples, using arguments, imagining possible actions or events, tell-
ing stories, stating or inventing myths, and so on. But central to Socrates' way of inquiring into 
things are two strands: elenchus (the activity of trying to get someone to refute or to convict 
himself or herself by way of his or her own words), and recollection (the activity of trying to get 
someone to realize or to recognize something by bringing it to consciousness, by registering it 
consciously). Elenchus has a negative aim in that it aims at teaching us that we do not know 
what we think we know. But, as I suggested before, see supra note 31, this lesson itself has a 
positive aspect, because learning that we do not know what we think we know is itself a positive 
lesson; it is a case of positive knowledge, because it reveals to us one of the limits of our knowl-
edge. To know that we do not know is to know something positive about ourselves; it is a net 
gain in self-knowledge. Similarly, recollection has a positive aim in that it aims at teaching us 
that we know more (or other) than what we think we know. But, again, there is a negative side 
to this knowledge, because what we eventually recollect may conflict with what we thought we 
knew. And, to the extent that we fail to recollect what is sought after, we learn that we do not 
know (or share) these things in common, or we learn that something is still blocking our access 
to this purported knowledge. So the dual aspects of Socratic inquiry-negative and positive, 
elenchus and recollection-run deep, and their relationship is complex. 
This dual aspect of Socratic inquiry is expressed below by my undergraduate philosophy 
teacher, Jon Moline: 
It is important to distinguish between Socratic elenchus and recollection. 
Elenchus is a method of testing and refuting false opinions. Recollection is a pro-
cess by which answerers are held to be able to supply true opinions on matters on 
which they have not been instructed. Recollection explains how the Socratic 
method or any other method is able to bring people into a condition of episteme. It 
is not itself a method, but rather a very tentative notion of the ontological and 
psychological basis on which philosophical methods can work. 
A close examination of the arguments in the Meno will confirm that elenchus 
is finished at 84a, before recollection begins. Elenchus removes the false opinion 
that one already has episteme and thus has no need to inquire (to embark on the 
process of recollection that Plato identifies with inquiry). Elenchus culminates in 
aporia (perplexity) and in the realization that one does not understand what one 
thought one did. Inquiry with the slave boy begins at 84d. At 84c, Socrates points 
out to Meno that as a result of the perplexity the boy now feels, he "will discover 
something by inquiring with me." Only at 85c does the boy "recover true opinion 
out of himself," that is, recollect. Clearly elenchus by itself was no more sufficient 
for attaining episteme in Plato's view in the Meno than it was later in the Sophist. 
Jon Moline, Recollection, Dialectic, and Ontology, in PLATONIC WRITINGS, PLATONIC READ-
INGS 233, 234-35 (Charles L. Griswold, Jr. ed., 1988) (footnote omitted). 
79. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 41 (83e). 
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(and to all of us), but only because Socrates has shown you (and us) 
how it can be derived from the preceding propositions that he has 
stated. For our educational benefit, Socrates is eliciting something im-
plicit in the mathematical knowledge that you have; but it is the 
teacher's act of eliciting these implications that makes them evident to 
you (and to us). Before, as the boy's mathematical knowledge stood, it 
was not evident to him what his knowledge implied. 
Socrates also is formulating these implications into additional mathe-
matical propositions, to which he then asks the slave-boy's assent. The 
boy gives it. But this does not show that the slave-boy was himself 
capable of formulating those same propositions (even though they de-
rived from knowledge that he had). He may have possessed this knowl-
edge in the sense that he could recognize the truth of these propositions 
or implications once they were stated or formulated for him by Socra-
tes, but this does not mean that the slave-boy's knowledge was enough, 
in itself, to enable him to state or to formulate these propositions or 
implications for himself or on his own. It was not; he could not do it. 
Whatever mathematical knowledge he possessed, it was dormant until 
awoken by Socrates' questioning and stimulated into use by Socrates' 
prompting. 
Second, Socrates shows the slave-boy how to go on with certain 
mathematical series concerning arithmetic and geometrical figures 
(what happens when one doubles the sides of a square, how to deter-
mine the area of a square, and so forth). Socrates is doing this, for 
example, when he asks the boy, "Try and see if you can tell me how 
much it [the length of a side of a square] will be."Bo In this respect, 
Socrates is showing the slave-boy how to use the basic mathematical 
knowledge that he possesses to generate new geometrical constructs. It 
is not, however, that the boy's basic mathematical knowledge is alive to 
him or something upon which he can immediately call. Rather, it takes 
an awakening of the boy's knowledge by means of Socrates' question-
ing in order for the boy to get into the swing of things, to get the hang 
of things. Gradually, eventually, the boy is able to generate some of his 
own answers to Socrates' questions. Of course, they are nothing more 
than basic answers to basic questions. Yet the boy is provoked by Soc-
rates' reminders and exercises into re-invigorating his dormant knowl-
edge of mathematical functions, computations, and operations, into re-
newing his mathematical know-how to the point where he can put it to 
use. 
So I do not agree with 'Socrates' remark, "I am not teaching the boy 
80. [d. at 40 (83e). 
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anything, but only asking him questions"81-as though "only" asking 
questions could not possibly amount to teaching! Socrates is doing the 
work here: he is eliciting and stating the implied propositions for the 
slave-boy's assent; he is formulating the rules for the slave-boy's appli-
cation; he is showing the slave-boy how to go on constructing different, 
yet related, geometrical figures and what their mathematical relations 
are as a consequence of those constructions. To elicit, to state, to for-
mulate, to express: these activities are a part of teaching. So, eliciting 
the implications of the boy's mathematical knowledge, generating pro-
positions to which the boy assents, and re-awakening the boy's powers 
of mathematical know-how (however modest they prove to be), all of 
these activities amount to teaching the boy something.82 
Taking what students have and showing them what, in fact, it is 
that they possess, as well as testing what they can do with it and ex-
perimenting with the possibilities and permutations of the material at 
hand, teaches those students a form of self-knowledge (since it is about 
themselves and their resources). But such lessons also teach these stu-
dents a form of knowledge about the world and their profession or 
their medium (since it also is about the world's possibilities, or those of 
their chosen profession or medium). And these lessons teach a third 
thing too. In addition to the reminders and examples that the teacher is 
giving to his or her students, the repeated invitations to remember 
what they know and to watch what happens when we do this, the 
teacher also is trying to get the students to collect their wits about 
themselves and to use these materials for themselves. This is the part 
of the Socratic lesson that intends to re-invigorate the students, to re-
new them through disillusioning them. 
Socrates makes the slave-boy's mathematical knowledge explicit and 
articulate. But he also expands and extends it, because by tying these 
new insights and expressions to the old mathematical knowledge and 
propositions that the boy possesses, Socrates is integrating them and re-
constituting the slave-boy's (modest) body of mathematical knowledge. 
81. Id. at 39 (82e). 
82. This is not so different from what we do in law school or from what many philoso-
phers do in proceeding Socratically in their classrooms. One main activity of such teaching is to 
elicit statements, answers, questions, and concerns from one's students, and then to examine 
these for their meaning, which includes their implications, their assumptions, and their conse-
quences. By so doing, we try to teach our students some of the implications of the things that 
they say (or are initially willing to say and believe) about cases, statutes, or regulations that they 
have been assigned to read and study. We also try to show our students how to go on with some 
of the knowledge that they already have (the techniques of reading and of criticizing, for exam-
ple, that they bring to the cases, statutes, or other legal texts). If these activities of questioning, 
parsing, and eliciting the implications (et cetera) truly qualify as "not teaching [our students] 
anything," then perhaps we do not teach anything in law school. (I deny it.) 
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In this respect, the boy is learning that knowledge is of a piece, that it 
is systematic, and that one can build or extend the system by eliciting 
its implications and by generating new propositions, formulae, or con-
structs.83 Sometimes the system will absorb or incorporate these addi-
tions, and sometimes these additions will modify or even revolutionize 
the system. The relation is symbiotic or internal between the parts and 
the whole. 
All of this activity or process of recollection is the second lesson that 
Socrates teaches, as stated earlier,84 the matching twin to his first les-
son in disillusionment. This second lesson teaches that we know more 
(or other) than what we think we know. It is a reminder of our pro-
digious resources, a call to remember the things that we have learned 
and the ways that we have learned them, a call to make ourselves con-
scious of the techniques and skills and tools that we have at our control 
for making sense of the world and coming to terms with it. Our knowl-
edge and our know-how constitute a system that generates knowledge 
(not merely collects it)-if we realize how to inquire into its connec-
tions, relations, and implications81l and thereby inquire further into the 
world of our common experience (which is a system, as Kant showed 
us). To the extent that we inhabit this system of knowledge, of lan-
guage, of culture, of a world, we "know" it already and possess it 
already. But to the extent that we remain unaware of or unconscious 
to any aspects of the system, leave them unmastered or unexplored, 
then we must re-collect these aspects if we are truly to know and to 
possess them, to understand them and to be able to put them to use. 
83. Once again, Professor Allen is helpful: 
[W)hat is meant by Socrates' claim that all nature is suggenes-"akin," or inter-
connected- ... [is) that by learning one single thing, we can recover all the rest 
(81d). The theory of Recollection is not only a theory of inquiry but also one of 
inference. A single bit of genuine knowledge can serve as the terminal link in a 
golden chain by which we can, Zeus-like, draw to ourselves the whole of intelligi-
ble reality. 
Allen, supra note 3, at 143-44. 
84. See supra p. 243. Peter Winch 'summarizes this Socratic lesson in a way congenial to 
my reading of the Meno when he says the following: 
[W)hen, in Plato's dialogue Meno, Socrates introduced the slave boy to Pythago-
ras' Theorem not by telling him the answer to the problem but by eliciting the 
answer from him, that is not just a rhetorical device either. The suggestion ... is 
that each of us has within him or herself the resources for answering the question: 
a point which Plato expre~sed picturesquely in terms of 'recollection.' The further 
suggestion is that ... no one truly has the answer who has not arrived at it for 
him or herself. 
PETER WINCH, Who is my Neighbour?, in TRYING TO MAKE SENSE 154, 156-57 (1987). 
85. This is what Wittgenstein means to be studying in his philosophical investigations of 
what he calls our "criteria" and our "grammar" or "grammatical knowledge." See supra note 
59. 
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We recollect them by questioning them and by inquiring into them. 
This is what Socrates teaches the slave-boy, and it is such knowledge 
that he promises all of us. It is the antidote to his other lesson, that of 
disillusionment. . 
Socrates' understanding of philosophical inquiry is that it is a matter 
of traveling from the known to the unknown; you travel from what you 
know to what you do not know. And if you travel well, doing what 
you need to do with what you have, then you will end by having do-
mesticated the unknown (in so far as you can do so). But how do you 
get from one to the other? Socr~tes' answer is that you begin with 
what you have, what you possess, what you can do--your knowledge, 
skills, capacities, and aptitudes-and then you pursue your questions 
and your doubts, wherever they may lead you, applying to them the 
techniques of knowledge-acquisition that you have. Different people 
may well differ in the techniques, skills, or capacities that they have; 
this matters less, however, than the fact that each person traveling the 
road of knowledge must exert himself or herself to the maximum. The 
attempt to learn must be made vigorously and strenuously, that is, con-
scientiously. As Socrates puts it in his prefatory remark to the ex-
change with the slave-boy, "there is no difficulty in ... learning, out 
of a single recollection, all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not 
faint."86 The work required is that of tracing and tying down the nu-
merous strands that, bound together, constitute the system of our 
knowledge (such as it is). 
This last point, about gaining knowledge by tying things down to 
our systematic understandings and resources as they stand, comes out 
best in the dialogue toward its end, after Socrates has finished his dis-
cussions with the slave-boy and with the interloper Anytus and is back 
asking questions of Meno and joining him in mutual pursuit of the 
answers. After a long discussion investigating whether or not virtue is 
knowledge, Socrates seems to suggest that even if virtue is not knowl-
edge, and even if knowledge of virtue is not possible, or at least is not 
possessed by a person, that person can still act virtuously.87 When 
asked how this is possible, Socrates says that true opinions, even if they 
do not amount to knowledge, can and often do guide our actions, and 
when they do, they lead to our acting virtuously. "Then true opinion is 
as good a guide to correct action as knowledge; and that was the point 
which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when 
we said that knowledge only is the guide of right action; whereas there 
86. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 37 (81d). 
87. See id. at 46 (87d). 
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is also right opinion. "88 
The fact that true opinions are insecure or unsteady does not mean 
that they are any the less true; rather, it only means that they are less 
stable than our knowledge, than things about which we, in fact, know. 
(Less stable perhaps because, while we may believe them to be true, 
we do not know them to be true, so they seem more transitory, or our 
possession of them is more fleeting.) Socrates then searches for an ex-
planation of this difference between the unsteadiness of true opinions 
and the steadiness of knowledge, and he finds it in the fact that, ac-
cording to him, our true opinions, even though true, are not "tied 
down," whereas knowledge is tied down to the reason(s) we have for it 
(and being tied down to reason is what makes knowledge so much 
more valuable than opinion, so much more useful as a guide to our 
actions). 
Socrates: I mean to say that they [certain works of art) are not very 
valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like 
runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they 
are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the 
nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful 
and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not 
remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are 
fastened by the tie of the cause [i.e., until they are tied down by 
giving an account of the reason(s) for them); and this fastening of 
them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. 
But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of 
knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is 
why knowledge is more honorable and excellent than true opinion, 
because fastened by a chain [of reasoning).89 
Socrates says that "this fastening of them [our opinions], friend 
Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it."90 If this is 
true, then I understand Socrates' emphasis on recollection as the re-
sponse to disillusionment in this way: When we are led to acknowledge 
our ignorance by means of the negative side of Socratic method (his 
"e1enchus"), we are asked not to quit in despair, but rather to renew 
ourselves in the home of knowledge that we possess. Our common 
knowledge, our common experience, our ordinary language-these are 
the things that we all share and possess, and they are our ways of 
learning what we need to know. They are the structures that we in-
habit and the abodes in which we take refuge in this world. Each in-
88. [d. at 58 (97b-c). 
89. [d. at 58-59 (97e-98a). 
90. [d. at 58 (98a). 
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quiry is a journey into the unknown from these inhabitations, but that 
is exactly why inquiry is necessary, and productive: because the world 
remains to be domesticated, to be brought under the rule of reason (in 
so far as it can be). Our method of inquiry is our way of tying down 
the unknown, of connecting the unknown with what we already know. 
We are asked by Socrates to remember what we already know, to test 
it critically, to reduce it to what we can rely upon or are sure of, and 
then to use it as our means of gaining new knowledge, more knowl-
edge. The positive side of Socratic inquiry (his "recollection") is the 
way that we learn how to tie our opinions down, to anchor them in 
whatever knowledge we have inherited or accumulated (from our par-
ents, from others, from our language and our culture, from our own 
experience). It teaches us to question things, and then to seek answers 
to the questions that we have asked. 
VII. "You AND I ARE NOT GOOD FOR MUCH": POVERTY AND 
PERSEVERANCE 
Socrates: I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, 
and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has 
been of me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to 
find someone who will help in some way or other to improve US.91 
The first twenty pages of the Meno take us from questioning to 
perplexity, from disillusionment to recollection. Up to this point in the 
dialogue, Socrates has been trying to teach his method of inquiry to 
Meno, first by practicing his art of disillusionment on Meno himself, 
and then by duplicating that feat with Meno's slave-boy. But, since the 
initial disillusionment leaves Meno wondering what the point or pur-
pose is to any inquiry into the unknown (Meno's challenge: "[H]ow 
will you inquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know?"92), Soc-
rates is forced to respond to Meno's question about the point of perse-
vering in their inquiry. If we can say that Socrates responds by evok-
ing similar disillusionment in the slave-boy, and then bringing him out 
of it by showing him (and Meno) that each person still knows much 
(because their knowledge is based upon learning by "recollection"), 
then Socrates has shown that this inquiry into the unknown is worth-
while. So the point becomes one of getting back to the inquiry, and 
getting back to the inquiry at hand is what the second half of the dia-
logue does. 
91. [d. at 57 (96d-e). 
92. [d. at 36 (SOd). 
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But the second half of the Meno is strangely anticlimactic. It re-
prises many of the questions raised and pursued in the first half (espe-
cially Meno's question: Is virtue taught, is it learned by practice, or is 
it a natural inheritance?) and it adds some new questions (in particu-
lar, from Socrates: Is virtue knowledge? If so, then who teaches it?). 
But a reader can still wonder whether very much progress is made 
toward reaching an answer to any oJ these questions. It is in this re-
spect, I think, in its evident failure to reach satisfying answers, that a 
reader can find the second half of the Meno to be disappointing. Yet, 
as disappointing as it may be, the second half of the dialogue seems to 
me to have its own important purposes, chief among them, producing 
the very disappointment that we feel when the inquiry ends 
inconclusively. 
What this disappointment forces upon us is a recognition that the 
Socratic method of questioning and inquiry, even when used properly, 
does not guarantee success. Pursuing his method is appropriate when 
we are in doubt, but using his method of inquiry does not promise that 
we shall ever achieve the knowledge that we seek. This is the poverty 
of Socrates' method of inquiry, the poverty of Socratic questioning. s3 
This impoverishment appears at the very beginning of the Men 0, 
when Meno first asks his question of Socrates and receives what, to his 
way of thinking, is a very strange response. 
Meno: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by 
teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then 
whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way? 
Socrates: 0 Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were fa-
mous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; 
but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their 
wisdom, especially at Larissa, which is the native city of your friend 
Aristippus. And this is Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the 
flower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and 
the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And 
he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and 
bold style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene 
who likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear 
Meno. Here at Athens, there, is a dearth of the commodity, and all 
93, At his trial, Socrates relies upon his personal or economic poverty as an indicator that 
he speaks the truth, See PLATO, supra note 22, at 28, 37 (23c, 3Ib-c). He does what he 
does-inquires ,philosophically into things-without regard for personal profit or gain. Here I 
am trying to tie this claim of poverty to the sense in which his method can also be said to be 
(philosophically) impoverished, and this too is a claim for its truthfulness. 
The poverty of method in Socrates is, I think, another point of intimacy between him and 
,Wittgenstein. For some thoughts on the "poverty" of Wittgenstein's method, see STANLEY CAV-
ELL, THIS NEW YET UNAPPROACHABLE AMERICA 70-72 (1989). 
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wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if 
you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or ac-
quired, he would laugh in your face and say: "Stranger, you have far 
too good an opinion of me if you think that I can answer your ques-
tion. For I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less 
whether it is acquired by teaching or not." And I myself, Meno, liv-
ing as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the rest of the 
world, and I confess with shame that I know literal)y nothing about 
virtue; and when I do not know the "quid" of anything, how can I 
know the "quale"? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I 
tell if he was fair or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the re-
verse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could? 
Meno: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that 
you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report 
of you to Thessaly? 
Socrates: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I 
have never known of anyone else who did, in my judgment.94 
263 
Socrates wants Meno to understand that, while Socrates cannot offer 
him an answer of the kind that he (Meno) has been taught by Gorgias 
to expect to such questions, Socrates may be able to offer Meno some-
thing else. If it then turns out that Meno takes this "something else" 
. offered by Socrates to be a pittance, something that is apt to appear 
impoverished when compared to the grandiose answers offered by the 
Sophists, that would be Meno's loss. At least, this is the way that I 
understand Socrates' long response to Meno's opening question, with 
its emphasis on his inability to answer in the way or the style to which 
Meno seems to have become accustomed: 
[Gorgias] has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand 
and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in 
which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may 
ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at 
Athens, there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to 
have emigrated from ·us to you.9I! 
Given his admission as to a "dearth" of wisdom, however, Socrates 
does not simply leave the discussion or give up the question. Rather, 
what he goes on to do-and this is the life of the dialogue-is to teach 
Meno a different way to ask the questions that are bothering him and, 
thus, a way to look for a different kind of answer. 
Is this an impoverished view of philosophy, of what philosophy of-
fers us and the wisdom (such as it is) that it makes available to us'? To 
94. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 23-24 (70a-71b). 
95. [d. at 23 (70b-7ta). 
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this question, I think that Socrates would unabashedly answer, "Yes." 
While he is dogged in his perseverance, in his seeking of answers to 
the questions that we ask ourselves (or, more often, the questions that 
he helps us to see that we need to ask ourselves), this does not mean 
that Socrates therefore believes that final answers are available. A fun-
damental aspect of Socrates' practice is getting us to see that such an-
swers are not available or possible; and yet, even so, despite this fact, 
or in its very light, what we need to do is to. continue to seek the 
answers that we do have available, the answers that are possible. Soc-
rates' questions are questions that we humans seem fated to ask our-
selves; and yet, we do not seem to know what kinds of answer they 
may have-or even whether these kinds of questions have answers at 
all. As Cavell puts it, "Such thoughts are instances of that characteris-
tic human willingness to allow questions for itself which it cannot an-
swer with satisfaction. "96 
Answers to such questions do not come once and for all, but rather 
serially or sequentially (when they come at all). And what may prove 
to be a satisfactory answer on one occasion or in one context may prove 
to be less than satisfactory on another occasion or in another context. 
And this fact-as to the fragility and specificity of answers, their fit-
ness only for a particular purpose in a given context-may require us 
to go farther, or to change directions, when certain perennial questions 
arise once again for us. But then, we should know this if we have 
studied Socrates' example, because doggedness in the pursuit of accept-
able answers to necessary questions is what Socrates teaches. (If some 
see this as an impoverished way to proceed, Socrates might grant their 
point, but only on his understanding of what constitutes both the 
promise and the poverty of his teaching and of what it achieves.) 
At the end of the Men 0, Socrates and Meno arrive at the following 
inconclusive conclusion: 
Socrates: ... To sum up our inquiry-the result seems to be, if we 
are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor ac-
quired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the in-
stinct accompanied by reason .... 97 
Socrates: Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the vir-
tuous by divine dispensation. But we shall never know the certain 
truth until, before asking how virtue is given, we inquire into the 
actual nature of virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now 
that you are persuaded yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do 
96. CAVELL, supra note 1, at 9. 
97. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 61 (9ge-100a). 
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not let him be so exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have . 
done good service to the Athenian people.88 
It would be a mistake to take Socrates' concluding comments on the 
source of virtue ("that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an 
instinct given by God to the virtuous"; "that virtue comes to the virtu-
ous by divine dispensation") as though' they were meant to be a f~nal 
answer, or meant to explain virtue. Rather, by resorting to this sort of 
gesture-virtue just appears on the scene, as though it were a gift from 
above-Socrates is saying that he does not have. an explanation of vir-
tue's source. What he offers us in closing is a myth-nothing less, 
nothing more-and the promise of further inquiry if we seek more 
enlightenment. "But we shall never know the certain truth until, 
before asking how virtue is given, we inquire into the actual nature of 
virtue."89 Right now, as the matter stands, for all we know, virtue is 
(or might be) the gift of God, divine inspiration. This is hardly an 
account of its source or origin; it is an apostrophe indicating that some 
more work needs to be done before we can render any acceptable or 
satisfying account of the source of virtue. As it stands, we do not yet 
understand virtue well enough to explain its source. And perhaps we 
never shall. 
The poverty of Socrates' method is the fact that it does not promise 
or ensure conclusive results. It may seek them, but it does not promise 
or ensure them. All that it promises is that life is worth questioning, 
that it repays questioning, and that it is worth our time to pursue the 
questions that we have or discover. Asking questions-some good, 
some not so good (good or not good in terms of their aptness or their 
timeliness)-and then responding to them appropriately, in a produc-
tive yet humble way, is at the heart of this dialogue and at the heart of 
Socrates' teaching. And by the end of the dialogue, I think, Socrates 
has shown us that his way of questioning is his faith, his hope for the 
future. This is what he puts his trust in; this is what he invests himself 
m. 
I said at the beginning of this Section that the second half of the 
dialogue is strangely anticlimactic, and yet it seems to have its impor-
tant purposes. I have tried to detail one of these purposes in the past 
few pages, but there is one additional purpose of the second half of this 
dialogue to which I would like to draw attention. We know that, nor-
mally, Socrates does not claim to know anything. So it is startling to 
find, at the beginning and the end of the second half of the dialogue, 
98. [d. (tOOb). 
99. [d. (tOOb). 
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two unusually forthright and bold statements of Socrates' beliefs. Here 
we have Socrates claiming to know, not just one, but two things. 
His first credo comes at the end of his examination of the slave-boy, 
when Meno and Socrates are discussing what that examination has 
shown. The second credo comes at the end of the dialogue, as Meno 
and Socrates are completing their entire discussion: 
Socrates: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have 
said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be 
better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to in-
quire than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that 
there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not 
know-that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and 
deed, to the utmost of my power. IOO 
Socrates: I, too, speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet 
that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture 
with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but 
this is most certainly one of them.lol 
Socrates is willing to say, to claim to know, this: (1) that it is better for 
us to think that we ought to inquire into things that we do not know, 
and (2) that knowledge differs from true opinion. These two credos of 
Socrates do not promise that knowledge is possible for us, or that we 
shall gain knowledge if we inquire into that which we do not know. 
They only say that it is better for us to believe that we ought to in-
quire, and that knowledge does differ from true belief. 
The moral of Socrates' two credos is worked out in detail in Socra-
tes' discussion with Anytus, who only appears in the second half of the 
dialogue. It is not otherwise clear why Plato needs to introduce another 
interlocutor at this point in the dialogue, but if we understand Anytus 
to be an exemplar of the negation of Socrates' two credos, then perhaps 
we shall see his usefulness. Socrates' first credo says that it is better for 
us to believe in the efficacy of inquiry; but, as I said earlier while 
discussing Anytus' role as one of the three students, Anytus does not 
believe in the efficacy of Socratic inquiry.102 In fact, he barely partici-
pates with Socrates' questioning, and he quickly leaves the discussion 
when he thinks that Socrates is defaming his fellow Athenians. On 
Anytus' model, inquiry is not good for us, but rather dangerous. 
Socrates thinks differently. I do not say that he thinks that inquiry is 
either easy or pleasant for us, and I doubt that he would deny its dan-
100. Id. at 44-45 (86b-c). 
101. Id. at 59 (98b). 
102. See supra pp. 226-27, 229, 231. 
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gerous consequences (not after his trial). But I do believe that Socrates 
would recommend inquiry to us despite its dangers (or perhaps he 
would have seen them as an inevitable cost of inquiry). In any event, 
Socrates asks that we believe in the efficacy of inquiry. We are to stick 
to it, to try again to understand that about which we are ignorant. 
This is a counsel to perseverance,' as it also is one of hope .. 
Anytus also denies (in practice) Socrates' second credo, the differ-
ence between knowledge and true opinion. For example, whereas Any-
tus may be quite correct in his belief that the Sophists are corrupters of 
youth and that the Sophists do not teach virtue to their students (a 
belief that was discussed in Section I of this Essayl08), Anytus does not 
bother to tie this opinion down to the rest of his knowledge by inquir-
ing into it. This cavalier attitude toward the basis of his purportedly 
true opinion (Anytus' claim to know about the Sophists) is what aston-
ishes Socrates: "You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot 
make out, judging from your own words, how, if you are not ac-
quainted with them, you know about them."lo4 Anytus acts as though 
true opinion-if his opinion of the Sophists is true-is just as good, 
just as solid or reliabl~, as knowledge. And this Socrates denies. 
Anytus' willingness to accept true belief as being as good as knowl-
edge contravenes Socrates' second credo, and it is the point on which 
the dialogue closes. If we truly wish to tie our opinions down-be they 
about virtue or some other topic-then, once again, we shall have to 
inquire into them and the matter at hand. We shall have to question 
them. For Socrates, and apparently for those of us who try to follow 
his example in our teaching, there is no other way. 
103. See supra pp. 226-27, 229. 
104. Jowett & Anderson, supra note 3, at 52 (92c). 
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